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Do Defendants Pay What Juries
Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas
Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003
David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver,
and William M. Sage*
Legal scholars, legislators, policy advocates, and the news media frequently
use jury verdicts to draw conclusions about the performance of the tort
system. However, actual payouts can differ greatly from verdicts. We report
evidence on post-verdict payouts from the most comprehensive longitudinal
study of matched jury verdicts and payouts. Using data on all insured
medical malpractice claims in Texas from 1988–2003 in which the plaintiff
received at least $25,000 (in 1988 dollars) following a jury trial, we find that
most jury awards received “haircuts.” Seventy-five percent of plaintiffs
received a payout less than the adjusted verdict (jury verdict plus prejudg-
ment and postjudgment interest), 20 percent received the adjusted verdict
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(within  2 percent), and 5 percent received more than the adjusted
verdict. Overall, plaintiffs received a mean (median) per-case haircut of 29
percent (19 percent), and an aggregate haircut of 56 percent, relative to the
adjusted verdict. The larger the verdict, the more likely and larger the
haircut. For cases with a positive adjusted verdict under $100,000, 47
percent of plaintiffs received a haircut, with a mean (median) per-case
haircut of 8 percent (2 percent). For cases with an adjusted verdict larger
than $2.5 million, 98 percent of plaintiffs received a haircut with a mean
(median) per-case haircut of 56 percent (61 percent). Insurance policy
limits are the most important factor in explaining haircuts. Caps on
damages in death cases and caps on punitive damages are also important,
but defendants often paid substantially less than the adjusted allowed
verdict. Remittitur accounts for a small percentage of the haircuts. Punitive
damage awards have only a small effect on payouts. Out-of-pocket payments
by physicians are rare, never large, and usually unrelated to punitive
damage awards. Most cases settle, presumably in the shadow of the outcome
if the case were to be tried. That outcome is not the jury award, but the
actual post-verdict payout. Because defendants rarely pay what juries award,
jury verdicts alone do not provide a sufficient basis for claims about the
performance of the tort system.
I. Introduction
Juries and jury verdicts occupy center stage in the political debate over tort
reform and in academic analyses of the tort system. In the political arena,
critics claim that juries are out of control and out of their depth, periodically
dispensing unjustified blockbuster verdicts, especially against defendants with
deep pockets. These critics argue that this “lawsuit lottery” encourages defen-
dants to settle even nonmeritorious cases, and imposes a sizeable “tort tax” on
the economy. Conversely, defenders argue that juries generally “get it right,”
and that blockbuster verdicts are rare and often reduced by judicial oversight.
Both sides support or oppose reforms based on their differing views of how
juries behave. In like fashion, legal scholars assume that most cases are
resolved in the shadow of what a jury would award, and an extensive literature
models litigation and settlement decisions in the shadow of trial outcomes.
Thus, jury verdicts are used as the principal endpoint in both the
political debate over tort reform and in academic analyses of litigation and
settlement dynamics. As one set of scholars explained, “jury trial verdicts
form the basis of what we think we know about tort litigation.”1
1Ostrom et al. (1992–1994:97, 98).
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However, using jury verdicts as the relevant endpoint can be mislead-
ing if post-verdict payouts differ significantly from jury awards. Downward
departures can result from judicial oversight (remittitur, judgment notwith-
standing the verdict (jnov), and appellate reversal), statutory damages caps,
and settlement dynamics (which are influenced by limits on collectibility).
Upward departures can result from prejudgment and postjudgment interest,
and settlement dynamics. Whatever the sources of these adjustments, poli-
cymakers should factor them into their assessments of the performance of
the tort system, and academics should consider them in analyzing litigation
and settlement behavior. In particular, we would expect cases to settle in the
shadow of what the plaintiff can expect to collect if the case is tried—not
solely in the shadow of the expected jury award.
Past studies of post-verdict adjustments and payouts are limited. Most
focus on judicial review of the verdict, and provide limited information on
actual payments by defendants and their insurers. Most past studies also
cover a limited time period and use data that are subject to sample selection
bias, typically hand-gathered from jury verdict reporters, court dockets, and
surveys.2
We employ a unique data set of all closed insured Texas medical
malpractice claims from 1988–2003 with payout over $25,000 to study jury
verdicts and the frequency, size, and reasons for differences between jury
awards and payouts.3 We find that post-verdict payouts fall substantially short
of both “adjusted verdicts” (jury awards plus prejudgment and postjudgment
interest), and “adjusted allowed verdicts” (adjusted verdicts less the effects of
damage caps and remittitur). Stated differently, although jury verdicts and
payouts are correlated, most jury verdicts receive a substantial “haircut” when
they are paid by the defendant. In particular, we find that (amounts in 1988
dollars):4
• Of 306 jury trials with plaintiff verdicts, 228 cases (75 percent) had
payment less than the adjusted verdict, 62 cases (20 percent) had
2See Section II for a summary of previous studies.
3This article is one of a series based on the Texas database. Other papers include Black et al.
(2005); Zeiler et al. (forthcoming).
4Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar amounts are in 1988 dollars; computed using the Con-
sumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (annual average) as a price index. Source:
www.bls.gov/cpi/. To convert to 2006 dollars, multiply by 1.71.
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payment roughly equal (2 percent) to the adjusted verdict, and 16
cases (5 percent) had payment greater than the adjusted verdict.
Across all 306 cases, plaintiffs with total adjusted verdicts of $482
million received payouts of $212 million, for an aggregate haircut of
56 percent. The mean (median) per-case haircut was 29 percent (19
percent).5
• The larger the adjusted verdict, the more likely and larger the
haircut. In cases with adjusted verdicts of less than $100,000, 47
percent of plaintiffs (25/53) received a payout less than the adjusted
verdict, with a mean (median) per-case haircut of 8 percent (2
percent). In contrast, in cases with adjusted verdicts over $2.5
million, 98 percent of plaintiffs (44/45) received a payout greater
than the adjusted verdict, with a mean (median) per-case haircut of
56 percent (61 percent). Haircuts are present in cases involving all
types of defendants, including physicians, hospitals, and nursing
homes.
• Judicial oversight (remittitur, jnov, and appellate reversal) directly
affected 5 percent of the plaintiff verdict cases (19 of 306 cases—15
remittitur, 3 jnov, 1 appellate reversal of a plaintiff verdict), and can
explain roughly 3 percent of the aggregate haircut.6 Statutory caps
on damages in death cases directly affected 40 percent of death cases
(26/66) and can explain roughly 14 percent of the aggregate
haircut. Statutory caps on punitive damages directly affected 23
percent of cases with punitive damage awards (5/22) and can
explain roughly 16 percent of the aggregate haircut. Thus, 67
percent of the aggregate haircut is attributable to factors other than
the direct effects of judicial oversight and statutory damage caps.
• These estimates likely overstate the direct impact of judicial oversight
and damage caps in explaining haircuts. Of the 42 cases in which
remittitur or damage caps applied, defendants paid less than 90
5“Adjusted verdict,” “haircut,” and selected other terms used in this article are defined in the
glossary in Appendix C. We treat payout as equal to adjusted verdict if it is within  2 percent
of the adjusted verdict in determining the number of “equal verdict” (zero haircut) cases.
However, we compute haircut on a case-by-case basis, so some “equal verdict” cases will have
small positive haircuts (2 percent or less).
6Cases involving jnov or appellate reversal following a plaintiff verdict will drop out of our
sample unless later settled for $25,000 or more.
6 Hyman et al.
percent of the adjusted allowed verdict in 25 cases.7 These outcomes
suggest that much of the portion of the adjusted verdict that was
“disallowed” by remittitur and damage caps might not have been
collected in any event.
• Post-verdict settlements were often at or below policy limits even
when the adjusted verdict exceeded these limits. In the 214 “single-
payer” cases for which we have data on policy limits, we estimate that
policy limits explain at least 73 percent of the aggregate haircut ($71
million/$97 million). In single-payer cases with adjusted verdicts that
exceeded the policy limits, 92 percent (71/77) received a haircut.
• Haircuts were reasonably common even for adjusted allowed verdicts
that were within policy limits. A bit over half (77/137: 56 percent) of
single-payer cases with adjusted allowed verdicts within policy limits
received a haircut. The haircuts in these cases were generally smaller
in percentage terms than haircuts in above-limits cases, but still
accounted for approximately 9 percent of the aggregate dollar
haircut in single-payer cases.
• There was a trend toward larger haircuts over time.
• In tried cases with pro-plaintiff verdicts, out-of-pocket payments by
physicians were rare, usually small, and usually unrelated to punitive
damage awards. There were nine cases in which physicians made
out-of-pocket payments, generally because an award exceeded policy
limits, plus three cases in which physicians paid small deductibles.
• In 59 cases, plaintiffs recovered more than the adjusted verdict; of
these, 43 involved a defense verdict, and 16 involved a plaintiff
verdict. In the defense verdict cases, plaintiffs recovered a mean
(median) of $206,000 ($137,000). In the plaintiff verdict cases, plain-
tiffs recovered a mean (median) of $69,000 ($27,000) in excess of
the adjusted verdict.
A principal conclusion from our research is that studying jury verdicts
without also studying post-verdict haircuts gives a misleading picture of the
overall performance of the tort system. So does studying damage caps and
judicial oversight without attending to policy limits and other sources of
haircuts. The tort reform debate has thus been based on incomplete infor-
mation. Proposed reforms should take into account the gap between payouts
7The total of 43 includes four cases in which both remittitur and a death cap affected the
adjusted allowed verdict.
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and verdicts, which is especially important when verdicts are large. The
academic literature on how jury verdicts affect claiming and settlement
decisions also needs to take post-verdict haircuts into account.
Section II describes previous studies of post-verdict adjustments and
payouts and summarizes the limitations of these studies. Section III describes
the Texas medical malpractice closed claim data we employed in our study.
Section IV outlines our basic findings on jury outcomes. Section V discusses
our results on the differences between payouts and adjusted verdicts. Section
VI discusses some implications of our research. Section VII concludes.
II. Past Research on Post-Verdict Adjustments
and Payouts
The empirical literature on post-verdict adjustments and payouts includes a
number of articles and reports, and one monograph.8 News reports on the
subject have also appeared, but they tend to concentrate on individual
high-profile cases.9 Table 1 summarizes the existing empirical literature, with
larger studies (more than 100 payouts) listed first, followed by smaller
studies, and finally the present study.
These studies suggest that plaintiffs often collect less than the jury
awards, particularly for large verdicts. Unfortunately, these studies have
numerous limitations, including spotty information on actual payments,
reliance on surveys or jury verdict reporters (which are incomplete and
subject to sample selection bias), restricted samples (whether in number of
cases, size of sampled verdicts, or number of years), failure to adjust for
inflation and interest, and failure to analyze the various sources of haircuts.
A majority are based on reported post-verdict adjustments by courts, not
actual payouts. Appendix A provides more detailed information on each
study. The present study is the most comprehensive longitudinal analysis of
8Some additional research discusses the dynamics of the post-verdict period, but does not
quantify post-verdict discounts. See Ostrom et al. (1992–1994); Vidmar (2002b).
9See, e.g., Hallinan (2004:A1) ($111 million verdict, but $6 million payment because of high-low
agreement); Fisk (1998) (“Large jury verdicts are frequently no more than an illusion. With
relatively rare exceptions, verdicts are cut back, thrown out, settled for dramatically less than the
original amount. Or they are awarded against people or entities with little or no money to pay
them. The larger the verdict, the more likely trial and appellate courts will whittle it down or
erase it. But smaller awards, too, face a minefield in the post-verdict process.”).
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post-verdict payouts. It is the only study to quantify the comparative impact
of judicial oversight, damage caps, and insurance policy limits on payouts.
III. Data Source and Methodology
A. Data Source
The Texas Closed Claims Database (TCCD) is a publicly accessible database
containing reports of closed personal injury claims covered by mono-line
general liability, commercial auto liability, commercial multiperil, medical
professional liability, and other types of professional liability insurance. We
describe this database in an earlier article, but summarize relevant parts of
that discussion here.10 The TCCD contains individual reports of all insured
medical malpractice claims involving payouts by all defendants of more than
$10,000 in nominal dollars closed between 1988 and 2003. A “claim” is an
incident causing bodily injury and resulting in a request to an insurer by a
policyholder for coverage. An insurer must file a report with the Texas
Department of Insurance (TDI) in the year a claim “closes,” that is, when the
insurer “has made all indemnity and expense payments on the claim.”11
When total known payments to a claimant by all defendants equal $25,000
(nominal) or more, the primary carrier for each defendant must complete a
“Long Form” that includes extensive description of the claim’s characteris-
tics and history. When total payments are $10,001–24,999 (nominal), each
primary carrier must complete a somewhat less extensive “Short Form” that
omits various data, including the cause of injury.12 When total payments are
$10,000 (nominal) or less, the primary carrier files an aggregate annual
report that does not provide any case-specific information. We use informa-
tion on the cause of injury in order to determine whether a claim involved
medical malpractice. Thus, we rely only on Long Form claim reports.
We convert all payouts to 1988 dollars using the Consumer Price Index
for All Urban Consumers (CPI) and study jury verdict cases with payout of at
10Black et al. (2005).
11TDI (2004:18).
12The TDI Closed Claim Reporting Guide (containing reporting instructions), the Long and Short
Forms, a summary “Closed Claim Annual Reports,” and the core data on which we rely are
available at 〈http://www.tdi.state.tx.us〉. In some cases, the online data were incomplete and we
used information provided to us directly by TDI.
10 Hyman et al.
least $25,000 in 1988 dollars (roughly $43,000 in 2006 dollars).13 In 1990,
TDI implemented a procedure to check each report for internal consistency
and reconcile individual reports with insurer-level aggregate annual reports.
TDI has acknowledged potential problems with reporting completeness and
consistency in 1988 and 1989. We have no reason to believe these problems
bias the sample of jury verdict cases that we study. In robustness checks, we
obtain similar results if we exclude 1988–1989 from our sample period,
except as specifically noted below.
Medical malpractice cases often involve multiple defendants and mul-
tiple insurers. Beginning in 1991, TDI sought to identify multiple reports
relating to the same incident (duplicate reports), but its approach is imper-
fect. In particular, TDI does not identify reports as duplicates if they were
filed in different years, even if they relate to the same incident. To identify
duplicate reports for 1988–1990, to correct for TDI’s underidentification of
duplicate reports, and to correct other reporting errors, we reviewed each
report involving a jury verdict and made a small number of adjustments to
particular reports.14 When two reports relating to the same claim were filed
in different years by insurers for different defendants, we designated the
last-closed claim report as the primary report. Except when we assess defen-
dants’ out-of-pocket payments, our analysis relies on the primary reports.
Identifying claims involving medical malpractice is more complicated
than one might expect. The TCCD offers several plausible ways of identifying
13The reporting thresholds are not inflation adjusted. Thus, some claims that are individually
reported on the Long Form in later years would have been reported on the Short Form in
earlier years. To address this “bracket creep,” we exclude from the sample eight jury verdict
cases with real payouts by all defendants between $25,000 nominal and $25,000 real.
14In identifying duplicate reports, we sometimes exercised judgment when claim reports were
similar but not identical. The exact procedure we used to identify duplicates is available on
request. Insurers also make some reporting errors that TDI does not catch. In a few cases when
both the error and the needed correction were apparent, we corrected the underlying data. For
example, one report apparently combined pre- and postjudgment interest and reported both as
prejudgment interest. The reported prejudgment interest amount was absurdly high as pre-
judgment interest alone, but matched closely the amount that should have been paid as both
pre- and postjudgment interest based on the statutory rate for each. In another report, the claim
was classified as involving a physician, when other information indicated it was against a nursing
home; the physician was the medical director of the nursing home but had not treated the
plaintiff. We treated this case as involving a nursing home. One report had a policy limit of
$10,300 but the primary carrier paid $975,000 (in nominal dollars); we concluded that the
reported limit was probably an error and treated the policy limit as missing. A list of the
adjustments we made to the data is available on request.
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medical malpractice claims based on the type of insurance, the defendant,
and the cause of harm. In a previous article, we generally relied on a broad
definition of “medical malpractice claims” that included all nonduplicate
“large” claims (claims with payouts exceeding $25,000 in 1988 dollars) that
were paid under medical professional liability insurance or were against a
health-care provider (physician, hospital, or nursing home) or involved inju-
ries caused by complications or misadventures of medical or surgical care,
and did not involve dentists or oral surgeons.15 We called the resulting data
set BRD cases, but verified in robustness checks that we obtained similar
results with narrower definitions.
For this study, we reviewed each report involving a jury verdict and
concluded that some BRD cases were not medical malpractice cases.16 We
therefore constructed a more restricted data set of verdicts, which we call
BRDminus. To be included in BRDminus, a case had to satisfy two of the three
criteria outlined in the previous paragraph (paid under medical professional
liability insurance; against a health-care provider; involved injuries caused by
complications or misadventures of medical or surgical care), or satisfy one of
the criteria with other information indicating that it was a medical malprac-
tice case.17 The BRDminus data set includes 361 cases tried to verdict, of which
349 (roughly 22 per year) were tried to a jury, and 12 (0.75 per year) were
tried to a judge.
During the period we study, Texas law contained three caps on
damages in medical malpractice cases—a cap on the sum of damages plus
prejudgment interest in wrongful death cases (death cap),18 a cap on puni-
tive damages (punitives cap), and a cap on all damages for cases involving
15Black et al. (2005). A number of other types of health-care providers (e.g., nurses and free-
standing medical clinics) are not separately listed in the reporting form, so we cannot study
them.
16For example, the BRD data set includes cases in which physicians or hospitals were defendants
because the physician, or someone working for the hospital, was involved in an automobile
accident.
17For example, cases against nursing homes involving falls that were paid by a “mono-line
general liability” or “other professional liability” policy satisfied only one of the three criteria
(health-care provider as defendant) but we treated them as medical malpractice cases. For the
full data set, not limited to jury verdicts, it is not feasible to examine each case, so we define the
BRDminus data set using the two-out-of-three rule.
18The damages cap on wrongful death applies to all medical malpractice cases in which the
plaintiff died. Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990). We assumed that the cap also
12 Hyman et al.
public hospitals. The death cap was approximately $975,000 in 1988 dollars;
it was indexed for inflation but otherwise did not change during our sample
period.19 A total of 66 jury verdicts involved wrongful death claims; of these,
26 involved adjusted verdicts that exceeded the death cap.20
Texas law caps punitive damages and provides that these damages are
available “only if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that
the harm with respect to which the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary
damages results from: (1) fraud; (2) malice; or (3) gross negligence.” The
punitives cap was modified by the Texas Legislature in 1995. For cases filed
before September 1, 1995, the cap was the greater of (1) $200,000 or (2)
(4 ¥ compensatory damages). For cases filed after September 1, 1995, the
cap was the greater of (1) $200,000 or (2) [(2 ¥ economic damages) + (the
lesser of noneconomic damages or $750,000)].21 Punitive damages were
awarded in 22 jury verdict cases; of these, six awards exceeded the cap.
The cap for public hospitals is $250,000 (nominal). This cap covers all
damages, including economic damages, and is not adjusted for inflation. We
cannot assess the importance of this cap because we lack information on
which hospital-defendants in our data set benefited from the cap.22
B. Data Set Limitations
TDI requires insurers to report economic, noneconomic, and punitive
damages and prejudgment interest based on what TDI calls the “court
verdict.”23 In Texas jury cases, the jury completes a verdict form in which it
determines economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages. The judge
either accepts these figures or reduces them (through remittitur, applying a
applied in cases closed in 1988–1990, prior to this decision. There were three cases in this period
with awards exceeding the death cap.
19Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, §§ 11.02, 11.04 (West Supp. 1998).
20The death cap is calculated on a per-defendant basis. We used the one-defendant cap level,
which may to overstate the impact of the cap in explaining haircuts.
21Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.003 (standard for awarding punitive damages); id.,
§ 41.008 (West 1997) (post-1995 cap); id., § 41.007 (West 1991) (repealed 1995) (prior cap).
22See Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Act § 101.023(a) (limiting damages to $250,000 for each
defendant and $500,000 for each occurrence for bodily injury or death). This cap was enacted
in 1985, so it was in effect throughout the period we study.
23TDI (2004:Long Form and Short Form, Question 11b1).
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damages cap, or perhaps both), and then adds prejudgment interest to
arrive at a “judgment,” which typically indicates the amount of prejudgment
interest and the total judgment amount, but does not contain a breakdown of
economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages. Thus, as a practical matter,
insurers had to look at the jury verdict to determine the amount of eco-
nomic, noneconomic, and punitive damages, and at the court judgment to
determine prejudgment interest and any remittitur. Roughly 35 percent of
the jury verdict reports omit prejudgment interest. One likely reason for the
omission is that the insurer reported information only from the jury verdict
form.24 TDI does not ask insurers to report postjudgment interest.
We estimated prejudgment interest for the cases where it was not
reported and computed postjudgment interest for all cases, relying on the
statutory rules for pre- and postjudgment interest. We can only estimate
prejudgment interest because the applicable rules in some cases require
information (e.g., the date and amount of a pretrial settlement offer by the
defense) that we do not have. We believe our estimates are reasonable on
average, but they may be somewhat high or low in any individual case.
Appendix B provides details on our calculations. We then compute
an “adjusted verdict” for each case, which equals the sum of damages
(as reported by the insurer) + prejudgment interest (reported or
estimated) + computed postjudgment interest. The adjusted verdict is the
amount to which a plaintiff is legally entitled, before taking into account
remittitur and statutory caps. In robustness checks, we verify that cases with
and without reported prejudgment interest otherwise appear similar, and
obtain similar results for the full sample of 306 cases, if we assume prejudg-
ment interest = 0 for the 104 cases where it is not reported.
An important limitation of the TCCD is that insurers complete Long
Forms only if the plaintiff receives at least $25,000. Thus, we have limited
data on trials that result in defense verdicts, jnov cases, and cases where a
plaintiff verdict is reversed on appeal. Most of these cases drop out of our
data set. A (likely nonrepresentative) minority of these cases, in which the
plaintiff nonetheless recovers at least $25,000 despite losing at trial or on
appeal, remains in the data set.
Each report includes policy limits only for the insured defendant, and
includes limits only for the primary policy covering that defendant. We do
24We address other possible reasons in Section V. If the insurer reported information only from
the jury verdict form, the insurer might also fail to report a remittitur. Our results would then
understate the role of remittitur in explaining haircuts.
14 Hyman et al.
not know which defendants had excess policies, except for the cases where a
payout on an excess policy was made. Even then, we do not know the limits
on the excess policy. Thus, we have a good measure of the directly relevant
policy limits only for “single-payer” cases in which only one defendant paid
damages (even if more than one was sued) and there was no payment by an
excess carrier. These cases are, on average, smaller than multipayer cases,
and hence not representative of all cases. We report regressions with policy
limits as an independent variable only for single-payer cases.
The TCCD includes only “insured” claims. This includes claims paid by
captive insurers and risk-pooling and risk-retention groups. It does not
include claims against “pure” self-insured providers (which do not rely on
captives or risk pooling). Most physicians carry malpractice insurance, but
many hospitals do not. We lack data on claims against the University of Texas
(UT) hospital system and on claims against UT-employed physicians. The
UT hospital system is self-insured, and UT-employed physicians are insured
by the UT system. Thus, our data set likely captures most trials in which
physicians make payments, but a smaller and unknown fraction in which the
payers are hospitals and other providers. We have no reason to believe that
the fraction of “missing” trials changes over time as a percentage of the total.
The TCCD reports whether a case was appealed, but does not specify
whether the appeal was heard or, if so, the outcome. Many cases are likely
appealed but then settled before the appeal is heard. Due to these data
limitations, we do not analyze the effect of appeal on post-verdict outcomes.
We use the last-closed claim report as the primary report. This report
should capture any prior payouts by parties that were not required to file
closed claim reports, such as self-insured hospitals. We may not capture all
payouts by nonreporting defendants, either because the insurer that filed
the last report was unaware of these payments or because the nonreporting
defendant had not yet paid when the last report was filed. Of the 306 plaintiff
jury verdict cases in our data set, reports for 12 indicate that other defen-
dants were still in litigation.
We do not have data on the identities of particular defendants, on
physician specialties, or on injury severity.
C. Summary Information on Our Data Set
Table 2 provides summary statistics on our data set.
As Table 2 reflects, during 1988–2003, approximately 5 percent of
closed paid claims in our data set went to trial, of which almost half settled
during trial. The actual fraction of cases that settled during trial is lower than
Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award? 15
this, since most medical malpractice trials end in defense verdicts, and most
defense verdicts drop out of our data set.25 Almost all trials involve juries.
Because bench trials are too infrequent for us to perform meaningful statis-
tical analysis on them, and the tort reform debate centers on juries, we
concentrate on the 306 jury trials that result in plaintiff verdicts.26 As Table 2
indicates, 215 of these cases were single-payer cases; 91 were multipayer
cases. Of the 91 multipayer cases, 80 involved two or more paying defen-
25See, e.g., Cohen (2004) (plaintiffs won in 26 percent of medical malpractice jury trials).
26The payouts in our small sample of judge trials are consistent with other research suggesting
that juries are not more generous than judges in medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., Cohen
(2004); Eisenberg et al. (2006).
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Completed trials with payout of








Completed trials with plaintiff
verdicts
306 9 315
Mean no. of plaintiff verdicts
per year
19.1 0.6 19.7


















Plaintiff Jury Verdict Cases with
Single paying defendant, single insurer (“single-payer” cases) 215
“Multipayer” cases (two or more paying insurers or defendants) 91
Note: Total claims, claims in which trial was begun, completed trials, and completed trials with
plaintiff verdicts, included in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims
closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars. Completed trials
include 46 cases with defense verdicts. Damages = economic + noneconomic + punitive
damages. Adjusted verdict = damages + prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Mean
(median) amounts are for completed trials with plaintiff verdicts, in thousands of 1988 dollars.
16 Hyman et al.
dants, while 11 involved a single paying defendant with payment by an excess
insurer.
D. Implicit Model and Statistical Methodology
Below, we present various ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses
of time trends, and the factors that are correlated with verdicts, payouts, and
haircuts. Our implicit model of the claims-generating process is that people
have some number Y of medical encounters per year, of which a fraction f
lead to a malpractice claim, of which a further fraction g lead to a complete
trial. A fraction h of completed trials produce plaintiff verdicts, of which a
fraction i are included in our data set (a case will be included if it involves an
insured defendant and a payout over $25,000). The remaining fraction
(1 - h ) of completed trials produce defense verdicts, of which a fraction k
are included in our data set (a case will be included if it involves an insured
defendant and, despite the defense verdict, a payout greater than $25,000).
We expect the fraction of plaintiff verdicts included in our data set to be
close to 1. The fraction of included defense verdicts will be substantially
smaller.
The number and nature of medical encounters can vary across time.
The fractions of these encounters that lead to claims, trials, plaintiff verdicts,
the fraction of verdicts included in our data set, damages, and payout can
vary across time and with the nature of the encounter, the characteristics of
the plaintiff and defendant, and the defendant’s insurance coverage. We
treat the plaintiff (defense) verdicts in our data set as resulting from inde-
pendent draws from a pool of encounters, each of which produces a plaintiff
(defense) verdict included in the data set with probability ( f · g · h · i )
[( f · g · (1 - h ) · k )]. We observe Y · f · g · h · i plaintiff verdicts (and
Y · f · g · (1 - h ) · k defense verdicts) in our data set, and the jury verdict and
payout amount in each, but have no information about the component parts
of these numbers, nor about verdicts or expected damages in the cases that
drop out of our data set.
For regressions involving adjusted verdicts, payouts, and haircuts, we
assume that, apart from a possible time trend, each defendant’s choice of
coverage limits is independent of other defendants’ choices, each jury
verdict is independent of other verdicts, and each haircut is independent of
other haircuts. These assumptions will not be strictly true. In particular, (1)
lawyers may adjust their trial tactics and which cases they choose to take to
trial based on prior success or failure; and (2) physicians may choose policy
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limits based on what other physicians do. Any cross-sectional dependence
should be partly captured, however, by our year control variable. There is no
evidence of autocorrelation across time.27
The distributions of adjusted verdict and payout have a strong posi-
tive skew. Regressions with one of these variables as the dependent variable
are often skewed as well, and thus violate the usual normality-of-errors
assumption of OLS. We address this concern in our regressions as follows.
We remove two outlier multipayer verdicts and, in regressions limited to
single-payer cases, one outlier single-payer verdict. These cases have large
haircuts, so removing them biases against our main results. We then gen-
erally take the natural log of adjusted verdict, payout, and policy limits.
The distributions of the logged amounts come respectably close to being
normal.28 Even so, residuals for the regressions reported below are often
not normally distributed. We address heteroskedasticity of the residuals by
using White’s robust standard errors in all regressions. However, skewness
in the residuals and outlier residuals may still affect our standard errors or
their interpretation. We perform robustness checks using robust regression
techniques, which reduce the weight given to outlier observations.29 Except
as discussed below, the results are similar to those we report using the
standard OLS model. Except as noted below, regressions using nonlogged
dependent variables are similar to the results using logged variables that we
report.
For regressions with year as an independent variable, we make no claim
that year causally explains anything; instead, year is a proxy for changes in
the world that have a time trend. For regressions that analyze the relation-
ship among different components of damages, we report associations but
make no claim as to causation.
27A Durbin-Watson test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no serial auto-correlation in yearly
mean and median ln(adjusted verdict), ln(payout), and haircut for the plaintiff jury verdicts in
our sample.
28The most troublesome variable is adjusted verdict. For ln(adjusted verdict), skewness (kurto-
sis) = 0.18 (2.43) for all cases and 0.24 (2.46) for single-payer cases. A Shapiro-Wilk test rejects
normality of ln(adjusted verdict) at p = 0.02 (0.04) for all (single-payer) cases, but cannot reject
normality of either ln(payout) or ln(policy limits) at p = 0.05.
29See Berk (1990). Except as discussed below, the results were similar to those we report.
18 Hyman et al.









max ,0 1 . (1)
In analyses of the factors that explain haircut size, we generally limit the
sample to 290 jury verdicts with a payout greater than the adjusted verdict
(positive haircut) or a payout equal to the adjusted verdict (zero haircut). In
counting the number of cases with positive haircut, zero haircut, or a verdict
bonus (payout greater than the adjusted verdict), we treat cases with payout
within 2 percent of the adjusted verdict as zero-haircut cases. In regressions
with haircut as a dependent or independent variable, we compute the exact
haircut for each case using Equation (1).
OLS regression techniques do not produce correct coefficients or
standard errors for regressions with haircut as a dependent variable because
the distribution of haircut has many small or zero values, and a few large
values. As a result, the residuals also have a strong positive skew. We return
to this problem below.
We define the “aggregate haircut” for a group of cases as the dollar or
fractional reduction in total payout for these cases, relative to the total



















IV. Basic Findings on Jury Outcomes
A. Time Trends
Figure 1 indicates that although there is some year-to-year volatility, there are
no obvious time trends in the percentage of paid claims resolved by a jury
30In some cases, we measure haircut relative to the adjusted allowed verdict (measured after the
effects of damage caps and judicial oversight), rather than the adjusted verdict. The definition
is similar to that in text.
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trial or the percentage of claim dollars that are paid as the result of such a
trial. Figure 1 includes cases in which payment followed a defense verdict,
but would be similar if we exclude these cases.
Regression analysis confirms that there was no apparent time trend in
the probability of a paid claim being resolved by a jury trial, or in payouts
after a plaintiff verdict as a percentage of all payouts during each year.
As in our earlier study, there was considerable year-to-year fluctuation
in mean and median verdicts, but no apparent time trends. There is also no
significant time trend in the variance of verdict amounts around the mean.
Figure 2 shows mean (top line) and median (bottom line) adjusted verdicts
for all plaintiff verdict cases, as well as mean adjusted verdict excluding the
10 largest cases (middle line). The large difference between mean and
median adjusted verdicts is consistent with other studies of medical malprac-
tice outcomes.31 The median is more stable than the mean, but also varies
substantially. Excluding the 10 largest cases substantially dampens year-by-
year fluctuation in the mean adjusted verdict and significantly narrows the
spread between the mean and median. This reflects the strong influence of
a small number of very large verdicts on the mean verdict.
Table 3 reports the results of a regression analysis of time trends in
per-case ln(adjusted verdict) and ln(payout). In all regressions, year is coded
31See Black et al. (2005); Cohen (2004).
Figure 1: Time trends in percentage of total payout and total number of












1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
% of Total Payout % of Total Cases
Note: Percentage of total cases, and percentage of total payout represented by jury verdict
cases (including defense verdict cases), in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical
malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars.
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as (year – 1988). This does not affect the coefficient on year, but allows the
constant term to be economically meaningful. We obtain similar results
using a nonparametric test for trend.32
Assessing whether jury awards have changed over time is difficult
because verdicts are highly variable, highly skewed, and limited in number.
Performing a log transformation of verdicts reduces but does not eliminate
the skewness in the distribution. A regression of ln(adjusted verdict) on year
(Regression 1) produces a point estimate of 3.0 percent per year, which is
economically meaningful and marginally significant. However, this result is
not robust. The point estimate drops to 2.5 percent per year and becomes
statistically insignificant for the NAR data set, and drops to 0.4 percent per
year (insignificant) in a robustness check that excludes 1988–1989 (when
reporting was known to be incomplete).
A similar regression with ln(payout) as the dependent variable (Regres-
sion 2) produces a statistically insignificant point estimate of 1.3 percent per
year. This coefficient remains insignificant in alternate specifications. The
lower coefficient on year for ln(payout), compared to ln(adjusted verdict), is
consistent with the evidence we report below on increasing haircuts over
time.
32See Cuzick (1985), implemented in Stata as nptrend. This test produces z statistics of 1.97 for
Regression 1 and 1.25 for Regression 2.




























Mean (excluding 10 largest)
Median
Note: Annual mean (all cases), mean (excluding 10 largest cases), and median adjusted
plaintiff jury verdicts for the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims
closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars. Amounts in thou-
sands of 1988 dollars. The excluded cases have adjusted verdicts of $8.3 million (1988$) more.
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In sum, there is weak evidence of a possible upward time trend in jury
awards, but we do not find evidence that jury awards are rapidly escalating.
There is no evidence of a time trend in payouts after a jury verdict or in the
number of jury verdicts (regression results not reported).33
B. Defendants
Table 4 provides summary statistics on the defendants who made payments
in our BRDminus data set. Roughly 70 percent of jury verdicts in our data set
involve a single paying defendant, most often a physician.34 Table 4 also
33These findings are consistent with those reported in our earlier article, which covered 1988–
2002. See Black et al. (2005).
34Researchers have speculated that the need for physicians to report settlements to the National
Practitioner Data Bank could make them reluctant to settle. See Waters et al. (2003). We find no
evidence that cases against physicians are more likely to be tried than other cases. If physicians
are more likely than other defendants to insist on trial, and if plaintiff success rates are similar
against different types of defendants (which we cannot test with our data), the fraction of
plaintiff verdicts in “physician-only” cases (in which the only defendants are one or more
physicians) should exceed the fraction of such cases in the full BRDminus data set, which includes
all cases. In fact, these fractions are similar, at (106/306 = 35 percent) for completed trials and
(4,479/13,269 = 34 percent) for all cases.
Table 3: Time Trends in Jury Verdicts and Payouts—Plaintiff Jury Verdicts










Adjusted R 2 0.0099 0.0023
Note: Regression of ln(adjusted verdict) and ln(payout) for trials with plaintiff verdicts in the
BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a
payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars. Regressions exclude two outlier cases with large
punitive damage awards. Amounts in thousands of 1988 dollars. t statistics, based on robust
standard errors, are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level (significance
suppressed for constant term).
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documents a surprising fact: approximately 12 percent of the payments in
the BRDminus data set are in cases with a defense verdict. We discuss these
cases briefly below.
C. Damage Awards and Outlier Verdicts
Juries award compensatory damages (economic and noneconomic) and
punitive damages. Table 5 summarizes the mean, median, and frequency of
different types of damages for our sample.
The mean awards, especially for punitive damages, are significantly
influenced by two large multidefendant cases with punitive damages
(adjusted verdicts) totaling $41 million ($46 million) and $16 million ($28
million), respectively. Both punitive awards were apparently uncollectible,
since the payout was a small fraction of the awarded compensatory dam-
ages.35 In Table 5, we present mean damage awards both including and
35We discuss the first case in Section V.D.2. In the second case, the insurer for the primary
defendant paid $966,667 on a $1 million policy; no other payment was made.
Table 4: Defendant Configuration in Jury Verdict Cases—Plaintiff Verdict








One physician 100 17 117
One hospital 18 1 19
One nursing home 14 0 14
Other single defendant 79 9 88
Subtotal single-payer cases 215 27 242
Multipayer Cases
Two or more physicians 6 3 9
Physician and hospital 50 6 56
Other multipayer (includes single
defendant with payment by two
insurers)
39 7 46
Subtotal multipayer cases 91 16 107
Total 306 43 349
Note: Completed jury trials involving different types of defendants for the BRDminus data set of
nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than
$25,000 in 1988 dollars. “Two or more physician” cases have only physicians as defendants.
Physician and hospital cases have one or more physicians and one or more hospitals as
defendants.
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excluding these two outlier cases. In our regression analyses, we generally
exclude these two cases, which might otherwise skew our results. In regres-
sions limited to single-payer cases, we exclude a third outlier for the same
reason. This case had an adjusted verdict of $13.4 million, but settled for
the defendant physician’s policy limits of $181,000. We include these out-
liers in nonregression analyses, including the discussions below of the fre-
quency and aggregate dollar size of haircuts, and the impact of statutory
caps.
In separate regressions (not shown) we find no significant time trend
in the mean or median award of economic, noneconomic, or punitive
damages. This is consistent with the lack of a significant time trend in overall
adjusted verdicts.
As Table 5 reflects, on average, noneconomic damages significantly
exceed economic damages. Prior research suggests that punitive damages
are awarded in about 5 percent of medical malpractice cases, similar to the
percentage in all tort trials, but does not distinguish between types of defen-
dants.36 We find that punitive damage awards are reasonably common
against nursing homes. In single-payer cases, punitive damages are awarded
in 28 percent (5/18) of cases against nursing homes; in 4 percent (7/162) of
cases against physicians; and in 6 percent of other single-payer cases (2/35);
36See Cohen (2004) (punitive damages awarded in 4.8 percent (15/311) of medical malpractice
trials vs. 5.4 percent (202/3758) of other tort trials in 2001 survey).










Total $133,878 $178,214 $69,618 $381,710
Mean $438 $582 $228 $1,247
Mean (excluding two outliers) $439 $555 $40 $1,033
Median $52 $185 $0 $318








Note: Total, mean, and median economic, noneconomic, punitive, and overall damage
awards, for plaintiff jury verdict cases in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malprac-
tice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars. The third
row excludes two outlier cases with large punitive damages awards. Amounts in thousands of
1988 dollars.
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they are also awarded in 9 percent of the multipayer cases (8/91). Punitive
damages were substantially more likely in single-payer cases against nursing
homes than in single-payer cases against other defendants (t statistic for
difference in proportions test = 3.94, p < 0.001).
Table 6 reports regression evidence on the extent to which different
types of damages are associated with each other. We do not control for year
in the punitive damages regressions due to the small number of these cases,
but obtain similar results in robustness checks that include this control.
Consistent with prior research on jury verdicts, we find in Regression 1
a positive association between economic and noneconomic damages.37 The
37See Viscusi (1988:213–15). Other studies have focused on settled cases, and determined that
they are resolved, on average, for a multiple of economic damages—although the multiple has
Table 6: Association Between Different Types of Damages
Dependent Variable
Regression





ln(economic damages) 0.43 0.43 0.11
(9.88)*** (3.12)*** (0.61)




Constant 7.49 2.26 7.77 1.80 1.92
(14.67) (0.73) (4.72) (0.79) (0.90)
N 203 20 18 15 13
Adjusted R 2 0.304 0.498 0.2204 0.6741 0.6873
Note: Regression of ln(noneconomic damages) and ln(punitive damages) for plaintiff jury
verdict cases in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed from
1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars. Regression 1 includes all cases
with both economic and noneconomic damages. Regressions 2–5 are limited to cases with
punitive damages, excluding two outlier cases with large punitive damage awards. Regression 3
is further limited to cases with both punitive and economic damages, Regression 4 to cases with
both punitive and noneconomic damages, and Regression 5 to cases with economic, noneco-
nomic, and punitive damages. Amounts in thousands of 1988 dollars. t statistics, based on robust
standard errors, are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level (suppressed
for constant term). Significant results, at 5 percent level or better, are in boldface.
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Pearson correlation coefficient between the two is 0.55. Also consistent with
prior work, we find an association between punitive damages and compen-
satory (economic + noneconomic) damages.38 In most cases with punitive
awards, the variation in compensatory awards explains the variation in puni-
tive awards reasonably well, as indicated by the 0.50 adjusted R 2 in Regres-
sion 2. These results suggest that, conditioned on punitive damages being
awarded, the variation in the amounts of punitive awards in medical mal-
practice cases is reasonably predictable, based on the compensatory awards
in each case.
A surprise emerges in Regressions 3–5, where we assess whether the
association between punitive and compensatory damages is stronger for
economic or noneconomic damages. Although the sample size in Regression
5 is small (13 cases with awards of all three types of damages), when both
types of compensatory damages are included separately, noneconomic
damages are strongly associated with punitive damages, whereas economic
damages are not.39 This suggests that the results in Regression 3 are driven by
the strong positive correlation between economic and noneconomic
damages.
V. Post-Verdict Payouts and Haircuts
A. Summary Statistics
We turn in this part to an examination of the differences between adjusted
verdicts and actual payouts, and the factors that explain these differences. At
a high level of generality, there are two ways of studying this question: we can
study either the factors associated with payouts or the factors associated with
haircuts. The two approaches are complementary; we present both because
they convey a more complete picture of post-verdict outcomes.
reportedly declined over time. See Daniels and Martin (1995, 2002:1807); Kritzer (1991); Ross
(1980).
38See Eisenberg et al. (1997, 2002); Eisenberg and Wells (2006).
39To test for whether collinearity between economic and noneconomic damages is a significant
concern in Regression 5, we computed a variance inflation factor. Our results (VIF = 2.07)
indicate that the regression results are not strongly affected by collinearity between these
variables.
26 Hyman et al.
Post-verdict payouts differ systematically from adjusted verdicts.
Table 7 presents data on damages (economic + noneconomic + punitive),
adjusted verdict (damages + reported or imputed prejudgment and post-
judgment interest), and payout. Defendants of all types typically do not pay
what the jury awards in both single-payer and multipayer cases.
Table 8 provides additional summary statistics by type of defendant,
including the percentage of cases with positive haircuts, mean and median
per-case haircuts, and aggregate dollar and fractional haircuts. The per-case
mean and median haircuts weight each case equally. The percentages are
smaller than for aggregate fractional haircuts because larger cases generally
receive larger percentage haircuts.
Overall, 228 of the 306 plaintiff jury verdicts (75 percent) had positive
haircuts, 62 cases (20 percent) had a payout equal to the adjusted verdict
(within  2 percent), and 16 cases (5 percent) had a payout greater than the
adjusted verdict (verdict bonus). Many haircuts are substantial. Adjusted jury
verdicts totaled $482 million, while haircuts totaled $270 million, for an
aggregate dollar haircut of 56 percent. Excluding the two outliers, the
Table 7: Damages, Verdicts, and Payouts by Type of Defendant—Plaintiff
Verdict Cases with Payout > $25,000
N
Mean Median
Damages Adjusted Verdict Payout Adjusted Verdict Payout
Single-Payer Cases 215 $658 $867 $416 $316 $205
One physician 100 $422 $546 $306 $247 $180
One hospital 18 $612 $851 $553 $314 $293
One nursing home 14 $539 $608 $341 $225 $209
Other single-payer 79 $965 $1,292 $502 $449 $238
Multipayer Cases 91 $2,640 $3,251 $1,342 $1,175 $633
Two or more physicians 6 $1,065 $1,371 $687 $1,496 $734
Physician and hospital 50 $1,826 $2,220 $1,461 $1,136 $633
Other multipayer
(excludes 2 outliers)
37 $2,144 $2,875 $1,204 $1,000 $633
Total (excludes 2
outliers)
304 $1,033 $1,336 $680 $412 $259
Total 306 $1,247 $1,576 $692 $433 $259
Note: Mean damages, and mean and median adjusted verdicts and payouts, for plaintiff
jury verdict cases in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed
from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars; selected rows exclude two
outlier multipayer cases with large punitive damage awards. Amounts in thousands of 1988
dollars.
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aggregate dollar haircut totaled $199 million, or 49 percent of adjusted
verdicts of $406 million.40
As Table 8 reflects, percentage haircuts were similar in single-payer
cases with physicians as defendants and in single-payer cases with defendants
who potentially have deeper pockets (hospitals and nursing homes). In a
regression limited to single-payer cases, using percentage haircut as the
dependent variable and ln(adjusted verdict), ln(policy limits), a physician
dummy, and a constant term as independent variables, the coefficient on the
physician dummy was positive but statistically insignificant.41
B. Post-verdict Payouts: Associated Factors
Most jury verdicts receive a haircut, while a few receive a bonus. We consider
in this section the factors associated with the size of post-verdict payouts. In
later sections, we examine the factors that are associated with haircuts.
Figure 3 provides a starting point for the analysis of payouts by provid-
ing a scatterplot of ln(adjusted verdict) versus ln(payout). Figure 3 includes
a 45-degree line indicating payout = adjusted verdict, plus a regression line
for ln(payout) as dependent variable, with ln(adjusted verdict), year, and a
constant term as independent variables. For small verdicts, payout and
adjusted verdict are similar and close to the 45-degree line. However, as
adjusted verdict increases, so does the expected haircut. As adjusted verdict
increases from $100,000 to $1 million to $10 million, the expected payout
(haircut) goes from $96,000 (4 percent) to $575,000 (42 percent) to $3.4
million (66 percent).
40The aggregate dollar haircut and aggregate fractional haircut amounts reported in Table 8
include the 16 verdict bonus cases, for which the aggregate bonus was $1.1 million. For the 288
cases with zero or positive haircuts (excluding two outliers), the aggregate payout was $200
million and the aggregate adjusted verdict was $401 million, for an aggregate percentage
haircut of 50 percent.
41The estimated effect of the physician dummy was positive but insignificant both in OLS and in
a GLM specification similar to Table 16. Haircuts were larger in multipayer cases—but so were
adjusted verdicts, and as we show below, larger adjusted verdicts are associated with larger
haircuts. Controlling for verdict size, haircuts were similar in single-payer and multipayer cases.
In a regression with percentage haircut as the dependent variable and year, ln(adjusted verdict),
a multipayer dummy variable, and a constant term as independent variables, the estimated
effect of the multipayer dummy variable was negative and marginally significant in both OLS
and GLM specifications.
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Table 9 provides regressions with ln(payout) as the dependent vari-
able. Regression 1 provides the fitted line shown in Figure 3. A 1 percent
increase in adjusted verdict is associated with only a 0.76 percent increase in
payout. Thus, the larger the adjusted verdict, the larger the expected gap
between adjusted verdict and payout.42 Regressions 2 and 3 divide the sample
into multipayer cases and single-payer cases. Dividing the sample lets us
investigate the role played by policy limits in limiting payouts because we
have policy limits data only for single-payer cases.
42In a separate regression (not shown) we find no evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship
between ln(payout) and ln(adjusted verdict). Thus, using a linear model to estimate this
relationship seems appropriate.
Figure 3: Scatterplot of adjusted verdicts versus payouts.
slope = 0.757
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ln_adjusted_verdict
4 5 6 7 8
log_adjusted_verdict
Observed values Fitted Values 45-Degree Line
Note: Ln(payout) versus ln(adjusted verdict), plus a dotted 45-degree line at which
payout = adjusted verdict, and a solid fitted line from a regression of ln(payout) versus ln(ad-
justed verdict), year, and constant term, for cases with plaintiff jury verdicts in the BRDminus data
set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater
than $25,000 in 1988 dollars, excluding two outlier cases with large punitive damage awards.
The regression line assumes a mean value for year.
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Regressions 4 and 5 add ln(policy limits) as a separate independent
variable, and divide the sample into “below-limits cases” (adjusted
verdict < limits) and “above-limits cases” (adjusted verdict > limits). We
exclude one case with missing data on policy limits. Controlling for ln(ad-
justed verdict), the marginal effect of ln(policy limits) on ln(payout) is
positive but insignificant in below-limits cases (Regression 4). In contrast,
for above-limits cases, the marginal effect of ln(policy limits) on ln(payout)
is economically strong and statistically significant (Regression 5).
(Throughout this article, we use a 95 percent confidence level in describ-
ing coefficients as statistically significant.) This is consistent with policy
limits acting as an important constraint on payouts.43 These regressions
43We study policy limits and the relationship between limits and payouts, in both tried and
settled cases against physicians, in Zeiler et al. (2007). There, too, we find a strong relationship
between limits and payouts.
Table 9: Regression: Basic Factors Associated with Payout—Plaintiff
Verdict Cases with Payout > $25,000
Dependent Variable
1 2 3 4 5








Year –0.010 –0.027 –0.008 –0.013 –0.004
(–1.44) (-2.14)** (-1.02) (-1.88)* (-0.27)
ln(adj. verdict) 0.757 0.810 0.731 0.832 0.263
(26.29)*** (21.38)*** (22.05)*** (13.83)*** (2.86)***
ln(policy limits) 0.059 0.712
(1.02) (6.36)***
Constant 2.79 2.31 3.06 1.144 0.242
(8.23) (4.35) (7.85) (2.50) (0.31)
N 304 89 213 137 76
Adjusted R 2 0.791 0.793 0.780 0.845 0.769
Note: Regression of ln(payout) in pro-plaintiff jury verdict cases against independent variables
as shown, for plaintiff jury verdict cases in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical
malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars.
Regressions 1 and 2 exclude two outlier multipayer cases with large punitive damage awards.
Regressions 3–5 exclude one single-payer outlier with adjusted verdict of $13.4 million, which
settled for the defendant physician’s policy limits of $181,000, and one case with missing policy
limits. t statistics, based on robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively (suppressed for
constant term). Significant results at 5 percent level or better are in boldface.
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offer a first look at the relationship between policy limits and payouts. We
investigate in more detail below the connection among policy limits, hair-
cuts, and payouts.44
C. Haircuts and Verdict Size
We turn in this section from payout to haircut as the variable of principal
interest. Table 10 provides details on the relationship among verdict size,
probability of haircut, and expected haircut size. It is evident that the larger
the adjusted verdict, the more likely and larger the haircut.
There is a wide distribution of haircuts, with different patterns for
smaller and larger adjusted verdicts. As the top-left quadrant of Figure 4
shows, in small cases, with an adjusted verdict less than $100,000, roughly
60 percent of plaintiffs receive 91–100 percent of the adjusted verdict.
Conversely, as the lower-right quadrant of Figure 4 shows, in the largest
44In robustness checks using robust regressions, in Regression 4, the coefficient on ln(adjusted
verdict) increases to 0.955 (t = 89.71), and in Regression 5, ln(adjusted verdict) lost significance,
while the coefficient on ln(policy limits) increased to 0.918 (t = 16.18). These findings are
understandable given our data and the nature of robust regression, which downweights outliers.
In below-limits cases, plaintiffs commonly recover most of the adjusted verdict; the cases in
which they suffer a substantial haircut are all, to some degree, outliers. This can be seen in the
scatterplot of Figure 5. In above-limits cases, plaintiffs commonly recover no more than the
policy limits; cases where they recover substantially more than limits are all, to some degree,
outliers.


















$25–100k 53 47 47 8% 2% 5%
$100–250k 55 60 29 16% 9% 12%
$250–500k 59 71 20 23% 14% 24%
$500k–$1M 41 85 12 31% 20% 32%
$1–$2.5M 53 92 6 45% 42% 46%
>$2.5M (excludes 2 outliers) 43 98 2 56% 61% 56%
Total (excludes 2 outliers) 304 74 20 29% 19% 49%
Total 306 75 20 29% 19% 56%
Note: Number of cases, percentage with positive and zero haircut, and mean, median, and
aggregate fractional haircut for different ranges of adjusted verdicts, for plaintiff jury verdict
cases in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed from 1988–
2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars. Outliers are two multidefendant cases
with large punitive awards. Amounts in 1988 dollars.
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cases, with an adjusted verdict over $2.5 million, payment of 91–100
percent of the adjusted verdict is uncommon, and many plaintiffs receive
only a small fraction of the adjusted verdict. Indeed, in these large cases,
60 percent (27/45) of plaintiffs receive no more than half the adjusted
verdict.
D. The Effects of Judicial Oversight and Damage Caps on Haircuts
We now turn to quantifying in more detail the factors that cause haircuts.
Haircuts can result from judicial oversight, statutory caps on damages,
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Percent of adjusted verdict paid
Note: Distribution of percent of adjusted verdict paid by adjusted verdict size, for plaintiff jury
verdict cases in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed from
1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars. Top-left chart is for cases with
adjusted verdict < $100k; top-right chart for cases with $100k < adjusted verdict < $500k;
bottom-left chart is for $500k < adjusted verdict < $2.5M; bottom-right chart is for
$2.5M < adjusted verdict. Right-most bar in top two charts shows all cases with payout > 150% of
adjusted verdict. Amounts are in 1988$.
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policy limits, and other settlement-related factors. Below, we examine as
many of these factors as our data set allows and quantify their relative
importance.
1. Judicial Oversight
Judges exercise ex post oversight over jury decisions in a variety of ways,
including granting motions for directed verdict or for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict (jnov), granting remittitur, and by appellate reversal.
Legal scholars have emphasized the importance of this oversight in con-
straining jury discretion, especially the potential for reduction or appellate
reversal of very large verdicts. Our data set allows us to quantify the effect of
remittitur and say a little bit about jnov and appellate reversal.
a. Remittitur Remittitur is an infrequent source of haircuts. Judges reduced
jury verdicts through remittitur in 4.9 percent (15 of 306) of the cases in our
sample. One of these remittiturs was apparently reversed on appeal.45 There
is no evidence that judges use remittitur to reduce punitive damage awards.
However, Texas has a statutory cap on punitive damages; judges might act
differently in states without such a cap.
As Table 11 reflects, remittitur is concentrated in cases in which eco-
nomic damages are a small proportion of total damages. The mean
(median) ratio of economic to total compensatory damages is 17.3 percent
(4.2 percent) in remittitur cases, compared to 39.6 percent (29.3 percent) in
45An appendix, available from the authors on request, provides details on each remittitur case.













Remittitur Mean $105 $928 $0 $1,033 17.3%
Median $12 $411 $0 $423 4.2%
Nonremittitur Mean $455 $565 $239 $1,258 39.6%
Median $53 $174 $0 $227 29.3%
Note: Damages in remittitur (15) and nonremittitur (291) cases in the BRDminus data set of
nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than
$25,000 in 1988 dollars. Mean punitive award in nonremittitur cases would drop to 42 if we
exclude two outlier cases with large awards. Amounts in thousands of 1988 dollars.
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nonremittitur cases. The difference in means is statistically significant at the
5 percent level both in raw dollars (t = 2.30) and in ln(dollars) (t = 3.17).
Remittitur had a substantial impact on damages in the cases where it
was imposed. The mean (median) dollar remittitur was $361,000 ($150,000).
The mean (median) per-case percentage remittitur was 25 percent (20
percent) of preremittitur damages, and the aggregate dollar remittitur was
33 percent of preremittitur damages.46
In the end, remittitur, including its effect on prejudgment and post-
judgment interest, reduced potential payouts by $9.0 million, which is 3.3
percent of the aggregate dollar haircut of $270 million. The reduction is
$5.5 million (2.0 percent of the aggregate dollar haircut) if we exclude the
reversed remittitur. However, this amount may overestimate the real-world
importance of remittitur. Excluding the reversed remittitur, defendants
paid less than 90 percent of the adjusted allowed verdict in 10 of the 14
remittitur cases, and paid less than 75 percent of the adjusted allowed
verdict in seven of these cases. These haircuts, even after remittitur, com-
bined with the tendency for the remitted amounts to be above policy limits,
suggest that some of the remitted amounts might not have been collected in
any case.
Remittitur can also affect cases where it is not directly applied. For
example, pending or potential remittitur motions could affect the parties’
bargaining positions and thus the post-verdict settlements.47 However, our
results indicate that the direct effects of remittitur can explain only a small
share of the aggregate dollar haircut.
b. Jnov and Appellate Reversal Our data set includes three jnov cases following
a plaintiff jury verdict and one appellate reversal of a plaintiff verdict.48
46If we exclude the case where the remittitur was apparently reversed on appeal, the mean
(median) remittitur drops to $244,000 ($123,000), the mean (median) per-case remittitur was
24 percent (19 percent), and the aggregate dollar remittitur was 27.5 percent of preremittitur
damages. It is possible that some insurers reported postremittitur rather than preremittitur
damages. If so, our data would understate the difference between remittitur and nonremittitur
cases on proportion of economic to total damages and understate the aggregate dollar haircut in
these cases, but overstate the percentage reduction in the adjusted verdict due to remittitur.
47The TCCD does not indicate whether a motion for remittitur was made, or was pending at the
time of settlement.
48The data set also includes: (1) 16 cases with a directed verdict for the plaintiff (perhaps
because the defendant contested only damages, not liability); (2) 11 cases with a directed verdict
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There may have been other jnov and appellate reversal cases that were not
reported to the TCCD because defendants paid less than $25,000 (nominal).
If so, our analysis will understate the effect of these two sources in generating
haircuts. In the three jnov cases that followed a plaintiff verdict, the total
adjusted verdicts were $3 million and defendants paid $1.5 million of this
amount, for an aggregate haircut of 50 percent.49 In the appellate reversal
case, the jury awarded $1.1 million, the judge reduced the award to $364,000
through remittitur, the defense successfully appealed, and the case settled
after the appeal for $100,000. Thus, jnov and appellate reversal are together
responsible for $2.5 million (roughly 1 percent) of the aggregate haircut.
Even if appellate reversal is infrequent, the risk of reversal could affect
the terms of post-verdict settlement. Defendants’ ability to delay payment
through appeal, while imposing legal costs on plaintiffs, could also contrib-
ute to post-verdict haircuts, even if the risk of appellate reversal is small.
c. Summary of Judicial Oversight To summarize, the direct effect of judicial
oversight can explain only 3–4 percent of the aggregate dollar haircut
(depending on whether we count the reversed remittitur). Although judicial
oversight of tort verdicts has received considerable attention from legal
scholars and policy advocates, it cannot explain the haircuts even in the cases
it directly affects, let alone the larger pattern of haircuts across other cases.
2. Punitive Damages Cap
As noted previously, Texas had statutory caps on punitive damages and
damages in death cases during the period covered by our study. No case was
affected by both caps, so we analyze them separately.
Punitive damages totaling $69.6 million were awarded in 22 cases in
our data set. Two large multidefendant cases accounted for $57.6 million of
this amount. Texas changed the formula for the punitives cap for cases filed
after September 1, 1995. The pre-1995 cap applied to 16 cases; the post-1995
for the defense, which later settle for at least $25,000; (3) 12 cases appealed by the defense,
where the plaintiff won the appeal; (4) one case where the plaintiff apparently appealed a
remittitur and won; (5) one other case where the plaintiff appealed and won, although a
plaintiff jury verdict is recorded (perhaps the trial was after the appeal); and (6) several
miscellaneous appealed cases in which the outcome is recorded as “other.”
49Two of these cases involved punitive damages. The adjusted verdicts (payouts) in these three
cases were: $2.3 million ($1.3 million); $523,000 ($96,000); and $156,000 ($109,000).
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cap applied to six cases. The post-1995 cap is less generous than the pre-1995
cap (see Section III.A for the cap formulas).
The punitives cap reduced allowed damages in five of the 22 cases, by
a total of $43.0 million (62 percent of the awarded punitive damages).
Including the effect on postjudgment interest (prejudgment interest is not
awarded on punitive damages), the punitives cap reduced the adjusted
allowed verdicts in these cases by $43.6 million. Thus, the cap can explain
roughly 16 percent of the aggregate dollar haircut. One large multidefen-
dant case accounted for almost all the reduction in adjusted allowed verdicts
($41.2 million). The jury awarded punitive (total) damages of $41 million
($46 million) to a 98-year-old plaintiff who sued a nursing home and its
physician-medical director. The punitives cap reduced the allowed punitive
damages (adjusted allowed verdict) award to $515,000 ($4.0 million); the
plaintiff settled for $550,000.50 Although the original “blockbuster” verdict
received press coverage, the final settlement did not.51 The defendants paid
less than 90 percent of the adjusted allowed verdict in three of the five cases
50This case had a complex history. The plaintiff was raped by a co-resident. In 1999, the jury
awarded compensatory (punitive) damages of $1 million ($10 million) against the medical
director and $4 million ($50 million) against the nursing home (all dollar values in this footnote
are nominal, and thus do not match the real dollar figures used in text). In 2000, the medical
director’s insurer filed a closed claim report, indicating that it paid $500,000 and another
insurer paid $300,000 for another defendant. The report indicated neither a remittitur nor an
appeal. However, according to Healthcare Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Rigby, 97 S.W. 3d 610 (2002), the
trial judge remitted the total verdict to $11 million, the nursing home appealed the punitive
damages award, and the appellate court held that punitive damages were unavailable because
the injury was due to criminal action by a third party.
We contacted plaintiffs’ counsel, who told us that the medical director had settled the claim
against him after verdict, but before judgment—which is why the 2000 closed claim report did
not reflect a remittitur or an appeal. The $300,000 payment was made by the medical director,
who then successfully sued his insurer to obtain reimbursement. The case against the nursing
home was resolved for an additional $1 million plus interest after the Texas Supreme Court
declined to review the case. To date, no closed claim report reflecting this $1 million payment
has been filed with TDI.
These facts complicate the coding of the post-verdict adjustments that occurred in this case.
For example, should the trial court’s remittitur count as a form of judicial oversight—or did the
judge simply apply the punitives cap, and the court of appeals then loosely called this a
remittitur? How should we treat the appellate disallowance of punitive damages? How should we
handle the unreported $1 million plus interest that was paid in 2003? We decided to code the
case as initially reported. That this case affects neither our regressions (it is excluded as an
outlier), nor our analysis of policy limits (which relies on single-payer cases).
51See Zuniga (1999:A37). The verdict was $65 million in nominal dollars, which is $46 million
in 1988 dollars.
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to which the punitives cap applied, and paid less than 75 percent of the
adjusted allowed verdict in two of these cases. This, together with the ten-
dency for the above-cap portion of punitive awards to also be above policy
limits, suggests that some of the disallowed punitive awards may not have
been collected in any case.
3. Death Cap
Throughout our sample period, Texas capped the sum of compensatory
damages and prejudgment interest in wrongful death cases at $975,000 in
1988 dollars; the cap was adjusted for inflation. Our data set includes 66
wrongful death cases. We can only estimate the impact of this cap because it
does not apply to medical expenses and the TCCD does not break out these
expenses. We assumed that none of the economic damages in wrongful
death cases were for medical expenses; this will overestimate the cap’s
effect.52 There may also be some cases in which plaintiffs do not prove
damages they otherwise could have proven, but could not collect given the
cap; we would underestimate the cap’s effect in these cases.
The death cap reduced allowed damages in 26 of the 66 wrongful death
cases, and eliminated approximately $31.9 million (45 percent) of the
damages plus prejudgment interest awarded in those cases. Including its
effects on postjudgment interest, the impact of the death cap was $38.4
million. Thus, this cap can explain roughly 14 percent of the aggregate
dollar haircut.
In 10 of the 26 cases in which the cap applied (representing $8.4
million of the reduction in potential payouts), the payout was less than 90
percent of the adjusted allowed verdict. In seven of these cases, defendants
paid less than 75 percent of the adjusted allowed verdict. These outcomes
suggest that some of the above-cap adjusted verdict might not have been
collected in any case.
To summarize, the punitive and death caps, taken together, reduce
the aggregate adjusted verdict by $82 million (roughly 30 percent of the
aggregate haircut). However, in some of the cases to which these caps apply,
other factors may have prevented plaintiffs from fully collecting the above-
52During much of our sample period, it was unclear whether the cap applied to compensatory
damages or to the sum of compensatory damages plus prejudgment interest. The courts
eventually ruled that it covered the sum of the two; we treated this rule as having been in effect
during the entire period. This will overestimate the cap’s effect. Columbia Hosp Corp. of
Houston v. Moore, 92 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tex. 2002).
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cap adjusted verdict. To the extent this is so, damages caps will have less
real-world impact on payouts than one would infer by assessing their direct
effect on adjusted allowed verdicts.
E. The Impact of Policy Limits
Prior research indicates that plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases rarely
pursue the personal assets of individual defendants and will generally settle
for the policy limits, instead of pursuing “blood money.”53 In this section, we
attempt to quantify the influence of policy limits on observed haircuts and
actual payouts. We limit our analysis to single-payer cases, which are the only
cases for which we have full information about policy limits. We exclude one
case with missing data on policy limits. Sample size thus drops to 214 cases.
Table 12 compares mean and median adjusted verdicts and policy limits for
single-payer cases.
We caution that single-payer cases are not representative of all cases.
Multipayer cases represent 30 percent of the cases in our sample but 61
percent of adjusted verdicts ($296 million of $482 million) and 64 percent of
haircuts ($174 million of $271 million). The mean adjusted verdict in mul-
tipayer cases is $3.2 million, compared to $867,000 in single-payer cases.
Median limits exceed median adjusted verdicts for all types of defen-
dants. Mean limits are greater than mean adjusted verdicts for hospitals,
53Baker (2001); see also Zeiler et al. (2007); Gilles (2006). This finding is not unique to personal
injury cases. In securities class action cases, it is also common for cases to be resolved within
policy limits, and quite rare for outside directors to pay out of pocket. See Black, Cheffins and
Klausner (2006).
Table 12: Adjusted Verdicts and Policy Limits in Single-Payer Cases
Defendants N
Mean Median
Adjusted Verdict Policy Limits Adjusted Verdict Policy Limits
One physician 162 $884 $814 $351 $658
One hospital 23 $931 $1,373 $348 $726
One nursing home 18 $507 $1,188 $225 $798
Other single-payer 11 $1,072 $3,341 $154 $776
All single-payer cases 214 $867 $1,036 $306 $668
Note: Mean and median adjusted verdicts and defendant policy limits for single-payer, plaintiff
jury verdict cases in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed
from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars, excluding one case with
missing data on policy limits. Amounts in thousands of 1988 dollars.
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nursing homes, and other single payers, but are less than mean adjusted
verdicts for physicians. Adjusted verdicts exceed policy limits in many cases.
Overall, 137 single-payer cases are below-limits (adjusted verdict < limits)
and 77 are above-limits (adjusted verdict > limits). Of the above-limits single-
payer cases, 65 involve physicians.
We expect to find larger haircuts for above-limits adjusted verdicts
because of difficulties with collectibility. Figure 5 displays the relationship
between policy limits and haircuts for the 205 single-payer cases with zero or
Figure 5: How do policy limits affect haircuts?
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ln (adjusted verdict / policy limit)
N = 205
Note: Figure shows per-case percentage haircut versus ln(adjusted verdict/policy limits), plus
best fit lines from GLM regression, with family (binomial, adjusted verdict) and a logit link, of
(adjusted verdict-payout) versus year, ln(adjusted verdict/policy limits), above-limits dummy,
interaction between above-limits dummy and ln(adjusted verdict/limits), and constant term,
for single-payer plaintiff jury verdicts in the BRDminus data-set of nonduplicate medical malprac-
tice claims closed from 1988–2003 with zero or positive haircut and payout >$25,000 in 1988
dollars, excluding one outlier. The regression equation is (z-values in parentheses): (adj.
verdict-payout) = 0.04 · (year) (z = 1.59) + 0.321 · (ln(adj/verdict/limits) (z = 2.06)** - 0.400 ·
(above-limits dummy) (z = -1.15) + 0.850 · [above-limits dummy · ln(adj. verdict/limits)]
(z = 3.76)*** - 1.20 (constant, z = -4.43)***. The coefficient on the interaction term predicts
the change in slope for above-limits cases, relative to below-limits cases. The regression lines
assume a mean value for year. Coefficients should be interpreted similarly to logit coefficients.
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positive haircuts (excluding one single-payer outlier discussed above). We
break the observations into below-limits and above-limits cases, and provide
separate best-fit lines for each group, from a regression of per-case haircut
against ln(adjusted verdict/limits), year, and a constant term.
Figure 5 shows a gradual increase in expected percentage haircut as the
adjusted verdict approaches the policy limits, and a much steeper increase
once the adjusted verdict exceeds the policy limits. The estimated slope in
above-limits cases is substantially larger than the slope in below-limits cases
and the change in slope is highly statistically significant (z = 3.76). Plaintiffs
simply have a hard time collecting amounts that exceed policy limits.
In providing regression lines and accompanying z statistics in Figure 5,
we estimate a generalized linear model (GLM) because percentage haircut is
bounded at 0 and 100 percent, with numerous small and 0 observations,
especially below limits. Thus, both the dependent variable and the residuals
have a strong positive skew, which means that slope coefficients and standard
errors from OLS may be biased. In practice, the bias does not appear to be
severe; OLS regression lines are similar to the GLM regression lines shown in
the figure. We undertake a number of robustness checks, using different but
also imperfect specifications, with similar results.54
Figure 6 provides a different perspective on the collectibility of
adjusted verdicts in above-limits cases, focusing on payouts instead of hair-
cuts. We provide separate histograms showing the fractions of below-limits
and above-limits single-payer cases with different ranges of payout/limits. As
Figure 6 reflects, 31 percent (24/77) of above-limits single-payer cases had
payouts between 95–105 percent of policy limits. Conversely (and unsurpris-
ingly), payouts in below-limits single-payer cases are virtually always resolved
with payouts below the policy limits.55
Thus, a majority of above-limits cases (41/77, or 53 percent) settle at or
below policy limits, with the limits effectively capping recovery. In individual
cases, even quite low policy limits can effectively cap payouts. Here are two
examples, which form part of the solid bar at payout/limits = 100% in
Figure 6.
54 We obtain similar results, using both GLM and OLS, if we first split the sample into below-limits
and above-limits cases, and estimate the coefficient on ln(adj. verdict/limit) for each subsample
(the OLS regression equation is haircut = a + b · year + · ln(ajd · verdict/limit) + e).
55The ratio would exceed 1 only in the unlikely (and, in our sample, nonexistent) case where a
plaintiff received a verdict bonus that resulted in an above-limits payment.
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• Case 7200012 (injury 1980; trial 1989). Brain damage to 55-year-old.
Adjusted verdict = $13.4 million; settled for the defendant-
physician’s policy limits of $181,000 ($200,000 nominal). We exclude
this outlier case in our single-payer regressions because it might
otherwise skew our results.
• Case 18800505 (injury 1989; trial 1993). Injury to a 44-year-old.
Adjusted verdict of $1.2 million; settled for the defendant-physician’s
policy limits of $80,000 ($100,000 nominal).
However, the remaining 47 percent (36/77) settle above limits. We discuss
below who makes these above-limits payments.
Table 13 presents a regression analysis of the relationship among
policy limits, haircuts, and payouts in single-payer cases. We separately
analyze below-limits and above-limits cases.
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payout / limit
Adjusted verdict <= limit Adjusted verdict > limit
Adjusted verdict <= limit: N = 137
Adjusted verdict > limit: N = 77
Note: Percentage of below-limits cases (hollow bars) and above-limits cases (solid bars)
within the indicated payout/limit ranges, for single-payer plaintiff jury verdicts in the BRDminus
data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a payout
greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars. Last solid bar includes all above-limits cases with
payout/limit > 205%.
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Regressions 1 and 2 are below-limits regressions measuring payouts in
dollars and ln(dollars), respectively. The 0.694 coefficient on adjusted
verdict in Regression 1 implies that an extra dollar in adjusted verdict is
associated with an additional 69.4 cents in payout.56 Regression 2 implies that
a 1 percent increase in the adjusted verdict is associated with a 0.86 percent
increase in the payout.
In Regressions 3–5, we turn to above-limits cases. We include separate
independent variables for policy limits and the amount of the adjusted
56In a separate regression (not shown) with policy limits added as an independent variable to
Regression 1, policy limits were not significantly associated with payouts in below-limits cases.
Table 13: Impact of Policy Limits on Haircuts and Payouts
Dependent Variable
Payout ln(payout) Payout ln(payout) Payout
1 2 3 4 5
Sample Below Limits Above Limits
Year -5.14 -0.014 -8.925 -0.002 -15.771
(-2.16)** (-2.15)** (-0.94) (-0.12) (-1.19)
Adjusted verdict 0.694
(10.49)***















Constant 65.98 1.66 81.79 0.43 309.52
(2.59) (3.02) (0.90) (0.50) (0.90)
N 137 137 76 76 76
Adjusted R 2 0.921 0.842 0.858 0.772 0.794
Note: Regressions of payout, or ln(payout) versus indicated independent variables, for single-
payer, plaintiff jury verdicts in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical malpractice claims
with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars, excluding one outlier case. Adjusted verdict
above policy limits = (adjusted verdict - limits). Amounts are in thousands of 1988 dollars. t
statistics, based on robust standard errors, are in parentheses. ** and *** indicate significance
at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively (suppressed for constant term). Boldface
indicates significance at the 5 percent level or better.
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verdict that is above limits (this variable equals (adjusted verdict - limits)).
Regression 3 indicates that, conditioned on the adjusted verdict exceeding
limits, plaintiffs collect 92 cents out of a marginal policy limits dollar. In
contrast, plaintiffs collect only 16 cents on the dollar for a marginal adjusted
verdict dollar above limits. Regression 4 tells a similar story using logged
amounts. Regression 5 drops adjusted verdict above limits as an independent
variable in order to ask: If all one knows is that a payout of at least $25,000
occurred, the year it occurred, the policy limits, and that the verdict was
above limits, how much of the payout can one explain? Quite a lot, is the
answer. About 79 percent of the variation in payouts in above-limits cases is
explained by policy limits (i.e., adjusted R 2 = 0.794). Adding the above-limits
portion of the adjusted verdict as an additional independent variable
increases adjusted R 2 to 0.86 (Regression 3).
We caution that these are estimates of average marginal effects. As the
scatterplot in Figure 5 shows, in many below-limits cases, plaintiffs recover
most or all of the adjusted verdict, while in a minority of cases, they suffer a
significant haircut. In many above-limits cases, plaintiffs recover nothing
above limits and receive a large haircut, while in a minority of cases they
recover a significant amount above limits.57
Figures 5 and 6 and Table 13 make it apparent that policy limits have a
substantial impact on payouts in above-limits cases. We attempt next to
estimate the extent to which policy limits explain the aggregate dollar
haircut in single-payer cases. We construct two estimates, a “caps-first” and a
“limits-first” estimate, as follows. Nine single-payer cases are affected by the
death cap, the punitives cap, or remittitur. To construct the caps-first esti-
mate, we assume that the difference between adjusted verdict and adjusted
allowed verdict in these nine cases is explained first by remittitur and second
by a damages cap.58 We then estimate how much of the remaining haircut
can be explained by policy limits. For cases with payout < limits, we assume
57In robustness checks using robust regression, in Regression 1, the coefficient on adjusted
verdict within policy limits (which for below-limits cases equals adjusted verdict) increased to
0.936 (t = 116.89), consistent with robust regression downweighting below-limits cases with
significant haircuts. In Regression 3, the coefficient on max (0, adjusted verdict – limits)
declined to 0.01 (insignificant), consistent with robust regression downweighting cases in which
plaintiffs recover above limits.
58For two single-payer cases with both remittitur and a binding death cap, we assume in
calculating the adjusted allowed verdict that the remittitur applies first and the death cap
second.
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that the difference between adjusted allowed verdict and limits is explained
by the policy limits. For cases with payout > policy limits, we assume that the
difference between adjusted allowed verdict and payout is explained by the
policy limits. Thus, for example, if adjusted allowed verdict = $2 million,
limits = $1 million, and payout = $800,000, we treat the haircut from $2
million to $1 million as explained by policy limits, and the haircut below $1
million as having other causes. If payout were instead $1.2 million, we would
treat the haircut from $2 million to $1.2 million as explained by policy limits.
This “caps-first” estimate is likely to understate the effect of policy limits
because: (1) it ignores any effect of negotiation against the background of
policy limits in explaining below-limits haircuts; (2) in some cases, available
limits may be less than reported limits because the reported limits were
eroded by prior payout or the policy includes a “defense-within-limit” provi-
sion in which the policy limits cover both payout and defense costs; and (3)
it ascribes haircuts in cases affected by caps or remittitur to the cap or
remittitur, when policy limits might have been a separately binding con-
straint. Thus, for example, if adjusted verdict = $5 million, adjusted allowed
verdict = $2 million, limits = $1 million, and payout = $800,000, the caps-first
approach treats the haircut from $5 million to $2 million as explained by a
damages cap even though the plaintiff might have collected no more than
the policy limits in any case.
To allow for the possibility that limits are a separate constraint on
payout in cases also affected by caps or remittitur, we also construct a
“limits-first” estimate. In this approach, we assume, for the six cases affected by
remittitur or caps that have an adjusted allowed verdict greater than the
limits but a payout less than the limits, that the difference between adjusted
verdict and limits is explained by the limits rather than the remittitur or cap.
The “limits-first” estimate is the same as the “caps-first” estimate for the
remaining 208 cases. Table 14 presents the results of this analysis.
Under the caps-first approach, we estimate that policy limits explain
approximately $71 million (73 percent) of the aggregate dollar haircut of
$97 million in single-payer cases.59 Caps and judicial oversight explain an
59To determine whether some of the haircut in single-payer cases might be attributable to
nonpayment by another defendant who was found liable, instead of the policy limits of the
reporting defendant, we examined above-limits single-payer cases in which (1) there was a
second, liable but nonpaying defendant, and (2) the jury verdict did not impose joint and
several liability, so that the primary defendant was only liable for a portion of the award. There
are five such cases, for which the procedure described in the text ascribes a total of $0.98 million
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additional $15 million (15 percent) of this aggregate haircut; the remainder
has other causes.60 Our limits-first estimate indicates that policy limits
explain approximately $85 million (87 percent) of the aggregate dollar
haircut in single-payer cases, while caps and judicial oversight now explain
only $1.5 million (1.5 percent) of the aggregate haircut in these cases.
Even under the caps-first approach, policy limits play a dominant role
in explaining dollar haircuts in single-payer cases, while the direct impact of
statutory caps explains a moderate fraction, and the direct impact of judicial
oversight explains a small fraction of the aggregate dollar haircut. In the
limits-first approach, statutory caps and judicial oversight fade into insignifi-
cance because they apply mostly in cases where the adjusted verdicts exceed
policy limits and the plaintiff collected less than the policy limits. However,
remittitur and caps are more important in multipayer cases, which we
exclude from Table 14 due to incomplete information on policy limits.
Remittitur or caps affect 33/91 (36 percent) of multipayer cases, compared
in aggregate dollar haircut (1 percent of the aggregate haircut in all single-payer cases) to policy
limits, which was owed by another defendant. If this amount were instead allocated to “other
factors above limits,” it would not materially affect the role of policy limits in explaining haircuts.
60The amounts and percentages due to caps and remittitur are different from those discussed
above because we earlier considered the full sample and are here considering only single-payer
cases.
Table 14: Factors Explaining Haircuts in Single-Payer Cases
Aggregate Dollar Haircuts in Single-Payer Cases (N = 214)
“Caps-First” “Limits-First”
Policy limits $70.7M 73% $84.7M 87.1%
Death caps $9.4M 9.7% $1.2M 1.2%
Punitive caps $1.6M 1.7% $0.08M 0.1%
Judicial oversight $3.8M 3.9% $0.2M 0.2%
Other factors above limits $3.4M 3.6% $2.7M 2.8%
Other factors below limits $8.3M 8.5% $8.3M 8.5%
Total $97.2M 100% $97.2M 100%
Note: Dollar amount and proportion of aggregate dollar haircut explainable by the indicated
factors, using the “caps-first” approach discussed in text (which ascribes haircuts to judicial
oversight, caps, policy limits, and other factors, in that order) and the limits-first approach
(which ascribes haircuts to policy limits, judicial oversight, caps, and other factors, in that
order), for single-payer, plaintiff jury verdicts in the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical
malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars.
Dollar amounts are in millions of 1988 dollars.
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to only 9/215 (4 percent) of single-payer cases. The single-payer results
accordingly understate the role of judicial oversight and caps in explaining
aggregate dollar haircuts.
F. Other Settlement Factors Affecting Haircuts
We have explored the effect on haircuts of the factors we can quantify—the
direct effects of caps, judicial oversight, and policy limits. As Table 14 indi-
cates, 12 percent of the aggregate dollar haircut in single-payer cases remains
unexplained (caps first estimate), with most of this amount coming from
below-limits cases. These haircuts could have a variety of explanations. Some
plaintiffs may be willing to accept a haircut in order to receive faster payment
or avoid the cost and risk of an appeal. For example, the plaintiff might waive
prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, or both, presumably because
the extra effort and delay needed to collect interest is judged not to be
worthwhile.
Some below-limits haircuts could be explained by high-low agreements
entered into prior to trial, in which the parties agreed that whatever the jury
decided, the plaintiff receive at least the “low,” but no more than the “high.”
As we discuss below, it appears likely that the payouts in some of the defense
verdict cases in our sample result from high-low agreements, where the
defense pays the “low.” It is also likely that some positive haircut cases result
from high-low agreements where the verdict exceeds the “high.”
Defendants may sometimes bargain for a modestly below-limits
payment in cases where limits are an effective cap by threatening to appeal,
or by otherwise holding out. The plaintiff may prefer a below-limits payment
today to an at-limits payment sometime in the future. Such a negotiation
dynamic could help explain the pattern we observe in Figure 5, where hair-
cuts in below-limits cases tend to increase as the adjusted verdict approaches
the policy limits. We do not have sufficient data to allocate haircut dollars
among these various explanations.
Overall, haircuts due to other settlement factors are common, but
typically not large in percentage terms. A bit over half (77/137: 56 percent) of
single-payer cases with adjusted allowed verdicts within policy limits still
receive a haircut. As Table 14 indicates, haircuts in these cases accounted for
$8.3 million (8.5 percent) of the aggregate dollar haircut in single-payer cases.
G. Insurer Payments Above Limits and Defendant Out-of-Pocket Payments
Who pays when a verdict exceeds policy limits? Table 15 quantifies the
incidence and magnitude of insurer payments above limits and defendant
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out-of-pocket payments in single-payer cases (excluding deductibles)61 Panel
A reports summary statistics on number of cases; Panel B reports dollars
paid. As Panel A reflects, there were insurer payments above limits, defen-
dant out-of-pocket payments, or both in 35 single-payer cases, of which 34
were above-limits cases, and 29 were physician only cases.62 All defendants
(physicians) paid out of pocket in a total of seven (five) single-payer cases, as
well as five (four) additional out-of-pocket payments by all defendants (phy-
sicians) in multipayer cases.63
As Panel B of Table 15 shows, insurer payments above limits in all
(physician only) single-payer cases totaled $11.7 ($7) million, while out-of-
pocket payments by all defendants (physicians) in seven (five) cases totaled
$1.6 million ($467,000). Thus, for all defendants (physicians), insurers are
responsible for 88 percent (96 percent) of the sum of above-limits and
out-of-pocket payments in single-payer cases.
Figure 7 shows how much of the above-limits portion of the adjusted
verdict in the 77 (65) above-limits single-payer (physician single payer) cases
was ultimately paid and who paid it. Of the above-limits amounts, 87 percent
(91 percent) go unpaid, 12 percent (9 percent) is paid by insurers, and only
about 1 percent (a fraction of 1 percent) is paid by all defendants (physi-
cians) out of pocket. Even above limits, insurers are the primary payers.
One might expect plaintiffs to collect more readily above limits from
institutional defendants than from physicians. For the 12 above-limits single-
payer cases with hospitals or nursing homes as defendants, 70 percent of the
above-limits amount is unpaid, 24 percent is paid by insurers, and 6 percent
is paid by defendants out of pocket.
H. Time Trends in Haircuts
Table 16 provides a regression analysis assessing a possible time trend in
haircuts, using per-case haircut as the dependent variable. We again switch
from OLS to a GLM regression specification, to address the possible bias of
61In three cases, defendants made small payments due to policy deductibles, totaling $79,000.
62The one below-limits case with an out-of-pocket payment involved a punitive damage award
against a physician, which the insurer did not cover. The insurer paid the compensatory
damages plus prejudgment interest on these damages.
63In two additional cases, physicians with excess insurance policies made out-of-pocket payments
totaling $74,000. In two other cases involving a physician and a hospital, two physicians and one
hospital made out-of-pocket payments totaling $776,000.
Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award? 49
OLS coefficients and standard errors due to the bounded dependent vari-
able and nonnormal residuals.
Regression (1) provides evidence that the per-case haircut significantly
increased over the time period of our study. The coefficient on year is
greater than 1, indicating that later years produce larger haircuts. We obtain
similar results in unreported OLS regressions and consistent results with the
Cuzick nonparametric test for trend (z = -3.64). Regression (2) controls for
ln(adjusted verdict); the trend toward larger haircuts over time remains
significant. This trend is stronger in multipayer than in single-payer cases
(compare Regressions (3) and (4)).
One possible reason for increasing haircuts could be the time trend
toward lower defendant policy limits.64 In Regression (5), we therefore add
ln(policy limits) as a control variable. The coefficient on year declines and
becomes insignificant. This is consistent with lower policy limits contributing
to the increase in haircuts. Another possible reason, suggested to us by Texas
practitioners, may be the trend, beginning in the early 1990s, for Texas
64Such a trend exists for physicians for the full data set of all closed claims (both tried and
settled). See Zeiler et al. (2007)
Figure 7: Who pays above limits?
All cases (N = 77), aggregate above-limit




Out-of-pocket payment Insurer payment Unpaid
Physician only cases (N = 65), aggregate
above-limit adjusted verdict = $79.1M
$0.3 $7.1
$71.6
Out-of-pocket payment Insurer payment Unpaid
Note: Sources of payouts for portion of adjusted verdict that is above limits, for all above-limits,
single-payer (physician single-payer), plaintiff jury verdicts in the BRDminus data set of nondu-
plicate medical malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with a payout greater than $25,000 in
1988 dollars. Amounts in millions of 1988 dollars.
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appellate courts to become more pro-defendant. This shift could increase
the value to defendants of a threat to appeal, and thus potentially produce
larger haircuts in post-verdict settlements.
I. Verdict Bonuses
Payment exceeded 102 percent of the adjusted verdict in 16 of the 306
plaintiff verdict cases (5 percent). The verdicts in bonus cases are usually
relatively small and the bonuses are usually modest, relative to the adjusted
verdict. The mean (median) adjusted verdict in the 16 bonus cases was
$290,000 ($182,000) compared to an overall sample mean (median) of
$1,576,000 ($433,000). The mean (median) bonus was $70,000 ($27,000).
There are also 35 cases in our data set with jury verdicts for the defense,
plus eight cases in which the judge directed a defense verdict, with a mean
(median) payout of $206,000 ($137,000). Many of the payouts occur very
rapidly after defense verdicts, sometimes on the same day as the verdict.
Overall, about half (22/43) of payouts after defense verdicts occur within 30
days of the verdict, compared to 29 percent (90/306) of payouts after
plaintiff verdicts [(t statistic for difference-in-proportions test = 2.89,
Table 16: Haircuts Over Time
Sample
1 2 3 4 5
All Cases Multipayer Cases Single-Payer Cases
Dependent variable (adjusted verdict—payout)
Year 1.075 1.08 1.158 1.026 1.026
(2.13)** (2.29)** (4.18)*** (0.88) (1.05)
Ln(adjusted verdict) 1.38 1.17 1.63 2.35
(2.92)*** (1.48) (3.29)*** (7.94)***
Ln(policy limits) 0.44
(-5.18)***
N 288 288 81 206 205
Note: GLM regressions, with family (binomial, adjusted verdict) and a logit link, of (adjusted
verdict - payout) on indicated independent variables, for plaintiff jury verdict cases with
payout  adjusted verdict (within 2%), for the BRDminus data set of nonduplicate medical
malpractice claims closed from 1988–2003 with payout >$25,000 in 1988 dollars. Coefficients
indicate the factor by which one multiplies the odds ratio for the dependent variable (which
equals (fraction of adjusted verdict uncollected)/(fraction collected)) for a one unit increase in
the independent variable. All regressions excludes two outlier multi-defendant cases with large
punitive damage awards. Regressions (4 and 5) exclude one additional single-payer outlier.
Regression (5) excludes one case with missing policy limit. Amounts in thousands of 1988 dollars.
z statistics, based on robust standard errors, are in parentheses. ** and *** indicate significance
at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. Significant results are in boldface.
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p < 0.01)]. Medical malpractice lawyers advised us that many of these quick
payouts likely reflect high-low agreements. However, we cannot be sure of
this because TDI does not ask insurers whether a settlement resulted from a
high-low agreement.
Other verdict bonus cases that follow defense verdicts, especially those
where the plaintiff appeals and the case is settled some years after trial, likely
reflect settlement in the shadow of the risk of appellate reversal. Some,
especially those with smaller payouts, could reflect a defense conclusion that
it will be cheaper to settle than to defend the appeal. Payment did not
exceed policy limits in any of the verdict bonus cases.65
VI. Discussion
For our sample as a whole, juries awarded more than twice as much as
defendants ultimately paid ($482 million vs. 212 million). Haircuts are
common in cases involving all types of defendants. The probability and size
of the haircut increases with the size of the adjusted verdict and increases
sharply when the adjusted verdict is above policy limits.
A. The Sources of Post-verdict Haircuts
Legal scholars have emphasized the importance of judicial oversight in
controlling jury decision making. We find, in contrast, that direct judicial
oversight (remittitur, jnov, and appellate reversal) is far less important than
is widely believed. Other factors, especially policy limits, have a far greater
direct impact on payouts than does judicial oversight. To be sure, the threat
of appellate reversal could account for some of the observed haircuts, and we
could lose some jnov and appellate reversal cases from our data set entirely
if they lead to a payout of under $25,000.
The same is true, though less dramatically, for the statutory damages
caps Texas had in place during this period (punitives cap and death cap). We
do not directly study other caps, such as the cap on noneconomic damages
that Texas adopted in the fall of 2003, which took effect too recently for cases
affected by this cap to be included in our data set. Still, caps of any sort should
reduce recoveries only to the extent that the above-cap amounts were other-
65Of the 20 bonus cases with policy limits less than the adjusted verdict and payout greater than
the adjusted verdict, in only one case was the payout at or near the policy limits. In this case, the
payout was 100 percent of the policy limits. The next highest proportion of limits paid was 77
percent.
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wise likely to be collected. Our results suggest that limits on collectibility—of
which policy limits and limited plaintiff ability to collect above limits are the
most important—substantially mute the real-world impact of statutory caps.
B. The Central Role of Policy Limits
It is clear that policy limits effectively cap recovery in many cases, but less
clear why. One study indicates that plaintiffs’ attorneys have a strong norm of
not pursuing personal assets, but the source and strength of this norm are
unclear.66 Press reports suggest that many physicians employ asset-protection
strategies, which could both encourage physicians to purchase policies with
low limits and also discourage plaintiffs from seeking to collect above limits.
Whatever the reason, plaintiffs’ lawyers consider collecting from physi-
cians to be sufficiently difficult that most do not even try. We interviewed a
number of medical malpractice plaintiff and defense lawyers in Texas. All the
plaintiffs’ lawyers agreed that they would not pursue a case against a physician
if the policy limits were insufficient to justify bringing the claim. Absent
unusual circumstances, they treated policy limits as a hard cap on recovery.
The prospect of an out-of-pocket payment was remote enough so that none of
these lawyers routinely even investigated defendant physicians’ wealth.
Policy limits thus may serve as a form of defendant self-help—a kind of
de facto cap, which is usually (though not always) effective in limiting
recovery. The availability of de facto caps, often with relatively low limits,
makes statutory caps less important in explaining payouts.
Of course, there are also haircuts in below-limits cases. Below-limits
haircuts are responsible for a sizeable amount of haircut dollars and reflect
the impact of factors other than the direct effect of policy limits on settle-
ment dynamics.
Policy limits may also provide a focal point for negotiating a high-low
agreement. Since policy limits often cap recoveries, they provide an obvious
upper bound for the “high” in a high-low agreement. Plaintiffs might well
agree on a “high” somewhat below policy limits in exchange for an assured
“low,” regardless of how the case comes out.
A puzzle for future research: When, why, and in what amounts do
potential medical malpractice defendants buy excess insurance policies,
rather than a larger primary policy, and how does the presence or absence of
66Baker (2001).
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an excess policy affect payouts? We have too few data on excess policies to
explore these questions.
C. Above-Limits and Out-of-Pocket Payments
Physicians are reported to be greatly concerned about the risk of personal
exposure and bankruptcy if they suffer an adverse jury verdict that exceeds
their policy limits. Media coverage often focuses on physicians who quit or
limit their practice due to fear of liability. Yet many physicians buy policies
with limits that are moderate relative to likely damages, when larger-limit
policies are readily available. As Table 12 indicates, the ratio of mean
(median) policy limits to mean (median) adjusted verdict for physicians in
single-payer cases in our data set was only 0.9 (1.9). About 20 percent
(34/169) of physicians who faced adverse jury verdicts had real policy limits
of $200,000 or less—well below the mean and median adjusted verdict. In
contrast, for physician-only cases in the NAR data set that were resolved
without a full trial, the proportion of physicians with real limits of $200,000
or less rises to 34 percent.67 Apparently, physicians with low-limit policies face
less risk of a trial, perhaps because plaintiffs are not willing to invest the
resources needed to bring a case to trial.
Physicians who buy low-limits policies are gambling that even if they are
hit with an above-limits verdict, they will not suffer material financial hard-
ship. An out-of-pocket payout following an above-limits verdict requires a
combination of events: (1) a malpractice case must be filed; (2) it must go to
trial; (3) the jury must find for the plaintiff; (4) the verdict must be above
limits; and, finally, (5) the physician must thereafter make an out-of-pocket
payment. There were only nine instances in 16 years in which physicians
made any out-of-pocket payment after a jury verdict. Even if the first four
factors are present, physicians still face limited risk—they paid out of pocket
in only 6 percent (4/65) of the above-limits single-payer physician-only cases,
with a mean (median) payment of $83,000 ($85,000). The risk of an out-of-
pocket payment without a trial is also quite small.68 Thus, the low-limits
gamble may well be rational.
67See Zeiler et al. (2007). Of 6,169 single-payer claims against physicians resolved without a
verdict, 2,098 (34 percent) involved real policy limits of $200,000 or less. A two-sample test of
proportions indicates that this proportion is significantly higher than the proportion of physi-
cians with policies of $200,000 or less who faced adverse jury verdicts (difference = 14 percent;
z = 3.80). Both the jury verdict sample and the nonjury verdict sample include duplicate reports.
68See Zeiler et al. (2007).
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When payments are made above limits, the principal payers are insur-
ers, not defendants. This finding, which also applies to settled cases, deserves
further study: How do legal rules and settlement negotiation dynamics—
either before or after trial—contribute to this practice? Why do insurers
sometimes pay above limits, and by how much? One possible explanation is
settlement in the shadow of the defendant’s Stowers claim against an insurer
who negligently refuses to settle a claim within policy limits.69 Some above-
limits payments by insurers may represent insurers “buying off” their Stowers
exposure in cases they take to trial after refusing a within-limits settlement
offer. Plaintiffs’ counsel advised us that they often make an at-limits Stowers
offer before trial to set up this dynamic. However, unless Stowers or another
reason for insurers to pay above limits applies, most of the above-limits
portion of adjusted verdicts in single-payer cases will never be paid.70
The frequency with which physicians buy low-limits policies, and the
effectiveness of these de facto caps, suggests that regulation of policy limits
should perhaps become a subject of discussion. In other areas where defen-
dants have limited personal wealth, including auto accidents and home
construction, states often mandate minimum insurance levels. Alternatively,
physicians could be required to disclose to their patients how much medical
malpractice insurance they are carrying, or state legislators could enact a
patient compensation fund. Currently, a number of states (but not Texas)
have financial responsibility laws that regulate how much malpractice insur-
ance a physician must purchase.71
One might expect haircuts to be larger, the impact of policy limits to be
greater, and the likelihood of an out-of-pocket payment to be lower in
single-payer cases with a physician as defendant, compared to single-payer
cases involving hospitals or nursing homes, which may have greater assets.
We did not find any of these effects. These findings present a puzzle for
future research.
69See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. 1929).
70Most above-limits payments in settled cases are also made by insurers. See Zeiler et al. (2007).
The reasons for insurers to pay above limits in these cases are unclear. Some payments could
involve Stowers risk as well, if the insurer had rejected an earlier within-limits settlement offer.
71See AMA, Liability Insurance Requirements 〈http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/
4544.html〉.
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D. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Expected Payout
Like other civil claims, most medical malpractice claims are resolved without
a trial. It is commonly believed that parties “bargain in the shadow of the
law,” with both sides negotiating in light of the expected trial outcome. The
conventional wisdom—and a standard assumption in the literature model-
ing tort outcomes—is that the present value of a settlement should reflect
the present value of the expected outcome at trial.72 Tort reformers accord-
ingly assert that extremely large verdicts, even if infrequent, increase the
“bargaining floor” for future claims.73
We find, however, that the visible signals of case value (i.e., jury ver-
dicts) routinely exceed the amounts ultimately paid to resolve cases. Insurers
and plaintiffs’ lawyers are repeat players and surely understand this dynamic.
They should base pretrial settlements on expected posttrial payouts, rather
than on expected verdicts. Blockbuster verdicts should affect settlements
only to the extent that these verdicts are collectible—which they often are
not, at least for our data set.
Our findings on settlement payouts and trial rates are consistent with
the view that expected payouts, not expected verdicts, drive settlements. If
plaintiffs were hypothetically to demand higher settlements in response to a
large verdict or two, defendants could either agree (leading to higher
average settlements) or refuse (leading to more trials). We found no evi-
dence of either effect in our data. Over the 16-year period we studied, there
were no time trends in mean and median payment per claim or trial rates,
and no observable tendency for settlements to rise in years following large
verdicts.
E. Statutory Caps
There has been great controversy over awards of noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases and many states have adopted caps on noneco-
72See, e.g., Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979). For more recent surveys, see Hay and Spier
(1998:442–50); Shavell (2004:ch. 17).
73See, e.g., Ted Frank 〈http://www.pointoflaw.com/columns/archives/001060.php〉 (“First, the
ratchet of increasing jury verdicts creates settlement leverage for malpractice plaintiffs by
increasing the range of plausible results. There’s a lottery-ticket effect: even a small chance of
winning tens of millions of dollars has significant value.”). See also Department of Health &
Human Services (2003) (“Even though few cases end with mega jury awards, they encourage
lawyers in the hope that they can win this litigation lottery, and they influence every settlement
that is entered into.”).
56 Hyman et al.
nomic damages.74 Texas adopted a cap of $250,000 (not adjusted for infla-
tion) on noneconomic damages in 2003, near the end of our sample
period.75 Similar caps have been proposed at the federal level. There has also
been controversy over large punitive damage awards in tort cases, including
medical malpractice cases. As noted above, Texas capped punitive damages
throughout the period we study.
We take no position in this article on the merits of such caps, but note
that caps of any sort will reduce recoveries only to the extent that the
above-cap amounts would otherwise have been collected. The de facto caps
created by policy limits will thus mute the impact of statutory caps on
payouts. In our data set, the direct effect of statutory caps explains a mod-
erate fraction of the aggregate dollar haircut in single-payer cases using a
caps-first approach, but a much smaller fraction using a limits-first approach.
The effectiveness of policy limits in capping recoveries could help explain
the mixed findings in several recent studies on the effect of caps on overall
malpractice payouts and malpractice insurance premiums.76
Moreover, at least in Texas, physician policy limits in all cases with large
paid claims remained roughly flat in nominal terms, and thus declined in
real terms, for policies purchased from 1988–1999. This implies that policy
limits became an increasingly strict constraint on recoveries as our sample
period progressed. Indeed, as the de facto caps created by policy limits
become stricter, statutory caps become less important. Consider, for
example, the Texas death cap. In 1988, the death cap was $975,000, but 55
percent (258/466) of the physician-defendants in our data set for claims
closed in that year had policies of less than this amount. Aside from the risk
of an out-of-pocket payment, the death cap had little bite for these physi-
cians. By 1999, the real death cap was unchanged (since it was adjusted for
inflation), but the percentage of physicians with policies less than this
amount had increased to 93 percent (660/713).
F. Future Research
Our findings have implications for a number of issues, including the prac-
tical effect of statutory caps on noneconomic damages given the separate
74See Avraham (2006b).
75Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.301 (effective Sept. 1, 2003). As noted previously, because
there is a time lag from filing to jury verdict, this cap does not affect our sample.
76See, e.g., Avraham (2006a); Zeiler (2006); Sharkey (2005).
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constraint of policy limits, how plaintiffs select cases for trial, and how lawyers
advertise case outcomes. We are addressing these and other issues in future
articles.
G. Representativeness
We have information on only one state and study only medical malpractice
cases. Although hospitals are involved in a substantial number of malpractice
claims, some are self-insured, while our data set is limited to insured claims.
Moreover, outcomes in cases against insured hospitals could differ from
those in cases against self-insured hospitals. These limitations raise obvious
questions about the representativeness of our findings. Although our find-
ings are broadly consistent with those in the literature, further research will
be necessary to determine whether our findings are representative of other
areas of civil litigation, other types of defendants, and other states.
VII. Conclusion
This article relies on a database of insured, Texas medical malpractice
claims, closed from 1988–2003. It provides the most comprehensive longi-
tudinal study of the relationship between jury verdicts and post-verdict
payouts in medical malpractice cases (or, indeed, in any form of tort litiga-
tion), and of the factors that affect actual payouts. Texas is a useful setting for
assessing jury verdicts and post-verdict payouts. It is the second largest state
by population, is often thought to be a pro-plaintiff state, and did not enact
major damage cap reforms during the period we study. Texas was also
declared to be in a “malpractice crisis” by the American Medical Association
in 2002, and four counties in Texas were designated “judicial hellholes” by
the American Tort Reform Association in the same year.77 If there were a
short list of states where one might expect to find runaway juries, soaring
verdicts, and physician out-of-pocket payments, Texas would be on it.
We find, instead, stable, perhaps gradually increasing verdict amounts,
infrequent out-of-pocket payments, and a large gap between adjusted ver-
dicts and payouts. The larger the adjusted verdict, the more probable and
larger the haircut. Haircuts also appear to be increasing in size over time.
Payments above policy limits were uncommon and came primarily from
77 〈http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes_report_2002.pdf〉; AMA: Medical Liability Reaches
Crisis in Texas 〈http://www.bizjournals.com/Austin/stories/2002/06/17/daily36.html〉.
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insurers. Out-of-pocket payments by defendants were rare, even in the worst-
case outcome of an adverse verdict above policy limits. There were a few
enormous verdicts, but these were generally settled for much smaller sums.
Yet when Texas enacted malpractice reforms in 2003, jury verdicts were
central to the public debate, while payouts were not. In our view, this meant
that much of the Texas debate over tort reform was based on an incomplete
and potentially misleading factual foundation.
Only a small fraction of the gap between verdicts and payouts is attrib-
utable to the direct effects of judicial oversight (whether from remittitur,
jnov, or appellate reversal). A moderate fraction is explainable by the direct
effect of damages caps, but much of the above-cap amounts might not have
been collected in any case. Instead, it appears that a combination of insur-
ance policy limits and the rarity of above-limits payments by defendant-
providers explain the bulk of the gap. In addition, other factors that we
cannot directly quantify, including risk aversion, reluctance to collect from
personal assets, the parties’ desire to bring the case to a close, and the use of
high-low agreements, probably explain some of the gap. Even where the
adjusted verdict is well within the policy limits, there are haircuts, albeit
much smaller than the haircuts that are typical for above-limits cases.
Although tort reform advocates focus on statutory caps, and legal
scholars focus on judicial oversight, most of the action in post-verdict payouts
lies elsewhere. To paraphrase Willie Sutton, policy and legal analysts have
been casing a bank without much money in it, while ignoring the much richer
bank next door. At least in single-payer cases, policy limits are where the
haircut dollars are. The parties surely bargain in the shadow of the jury, but in
most cases, the terms of the bargain are shaped by the shadow of coverage.
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Appendix A: Prior Research on Post-verdict
Adjustments and Payouts
This appendix provides additional details on the prior research on post-
verdict adjustments and payouts that is summarized in Table 1.78 Most
studies start with a set of verdicts, and obtain partial information on post-
verdict adjustments by courts. One study starts with data on payouts and
looks for matching data on verdicts. None of the studies takes into account
postjudgment interest or policy limits. Only one study adjusts for inflation.
Larger Studies
We consider first the three studies with sample sizes over 100. These studies
all rely on commercial verdict reporters to obtain jury verdicts, and on
verdict reporters or surveys of lawyers as their source of data on post-verdict
adjustments and payouts. Commercial reporters are biased toward including
larger verdicts because they rely on reports by plaintiffs’ lawyers for many of
their cases and these lawyers tend to report their more important (i.e.,
successful) cases. Commercial reporters could also be biased in the cases for
which they contain data on post-verdict adjustments. Plaintiffs’ lawyers may
be more likely to report cases where they collect larger awards. Post-verdict
adjustments are also more likely to be reported if they occur soon after the
verdict. As the descriptions that follow make clear, information on post-
verdict adjustments due to remittitur or statutory caps is much more acces-
sible than information on actual payouts.
Vidmar, Gross, and Rose (1999) studied jury awards and post-verdict
adjustments in medical malpractice cases in New York (1985–1997), Florida
(1987–1996), and California (1991–1997). They did not have information
on actual payouts. This is the only prior study that adjusts for inflation. The
mean (median) per-case haircut was 38 percent (27 percent) of the verdict
in New York, 8 percent (7 percent) in Florida, and 10 percent (11 percent)
in California. In New York, the larger the verdict, the more likely it was to be
78Citations to the studies are provided in Table 1.
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trimmed, and the larger the haircut: “some of the largest awards ultimately
resulted in settlements between 5 and 10 percent of the original jury award.”
The authors treated a verdict reduction due to comparative negligence as a
decrease in the jury verdict, but it was not possible to determine how large an
impact this had on their findings.
The other two larger studies are somewhat dated. Broder (1986) studied
jury awards of $1 million or more that occurred anywhere in the United States
during 1984–1985. She surveyed attorneys involved in the cases for informa-
tion on actual payouts. It is unclear how many of the cases in her sample
involved medical malpractice.79 Medical malpractice verdicts received an
aggregate dollar haircut of 31 percent and a mean per-case haircut of 27
percent. Across all cases, the aggregate dollar haircut was 57 percent and the
mean per-case haircut was 30 percent. The study is limited by its focus on large
verdicts and its minimal evaluation of the factors that explain these haircuts.
Shanley and Peterson (1983) studied jury verdicts from Illinois and
California from 1982–1984, and surveyed the involved attorneys to obtain
information about payouts. They obtained verdicts using a database main-
tained by the Institute for Civil Justice, which was based on information
gathered from jury verdict reporters. They found that payout was less than the
verdict in about 25 percent of plaintiff verdict cases, with larger reductions in
cases involving larger verdicts. For all cases, they found an aggregate dollar
haircut of 29 percent, with mean per-case haircuts ranging from 7 percent for
verdicts under $100,000 to 43 percent in cases with verdicts over $10,000,000.
The haircut varied depending on the type of case, with medical malpractice
cases having slightly higher haircuts (without controlling for size) than their
sample as a whole. In the cases that were resolved with a haircut, more than
half the time (62 percent), the parties settled for less than the verdict, with
court-ordered reductions (23 percent), difficulties collecting the judgment
(13 percent), and unspecified factors (2 percent) accounting for the balance.
In 2 percent of plaintiff verdict cases, payments exceeded verdicts.
Smaller Studies
The remaining studies have small sample sizes (50 or less) and most did not
conduct regression analysis, which limits what one can learn from them. The
79Broder’s original data set included 472 cases, but information on post-verdict adjustments was
available only for 198 cases. Medical malpractice cases comprised 18.9 percent of the larger data
set. Broder did not provide a breakdown for the smaller data set, but if the same proportion
applied there would be 37 medical malpractice cases.
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most recent study, by Vidmar, MacKillop, & Lee (2006), is on Florida
medical malpractice cases in which more than $1 million (nominal) was
awarded between 1990 and 2003. The authors rely on a Florida closed claim
database that includes data on payouts but not on verdicts. The authors
hand-collected 50 matching verdicts by searching court dockets. The authors
did not adjust for inflation, or calculate pre- and postjudgment interest. They
found that the mean per-claim haircut was 33 percent of the verdict, with
larger verdicts generally receiving larger haircuts. The authors do not study
factors other than verdict size that might affect haircuts; their assessment of
the effect of size is weakened because their sample is limited to larger
verdicts; and they offer no regressions or other statistical tests of their results.
Vidmar, Robinson, & MacKillop (2006) conducted a similar study on
Illinois medical malpractice cases, using data gathered from jury verdict
reporters. The study focused on jury verdicts in Cook and DuPage Counties
from 2001, and found an aggregate dollar haircut of 42 percent. The authors
were only able to obtain post-verdict adjustment data for a fraction of the
cases they identified (12/45).
Viscusi (2004) studies cases with “blockbuster” punitive damage awards
of at least $100 million from 1985–2003. These cases were identified using
various computer databases and media reports. Most of the cases involved jury
trials and large corporate defendants. Viscusi was only able to determine
post-verdict adjustments and/or actual payouts for 10 of the 64 cases in his
data set; two of these were medical malpractice cases—one involving a nursing
home and the other involving a lawsuit against a physician and a drug
company. As Viscusi notes, “nondisclosure of the settlement amount appears
to be the norm for such settlements.” Limitations of the study include its focus
on extremely large punitive damage verdicts and the small number of cases for
which information on post-verdict adjustments or payouts was available.
Merritt and Barry (1999) study a small sample of medical malpractice
and products liability cases over a 12-year period in a single county in Ohio.
The authors identified verdicts using verdict summaries prepared for the
Columbus Bar Association and three commercial verdict reporters. They
analyzed verdicts and post-verdict adjustments based on these sources and
limited searches of court files. The authors did not adjust for inflation, or
calculate pre- and postjudgment interest. They found that verdicts were
reduced in 10 of 35 medical malpractice cases (28 percent), including four
of the five highest awards. In four of the 10 cases with haircuts, settlement
was after an appeal was filed, but before the appeal was heard. The mean
per-case haircut was approximately 25 percent. They also study nine product
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liability cases; none had a haircut relative to the verdict. The limitations of
this study include its small sample, its focus on a single county, and the
potential sample selection bias due to their data sources.
Professor Vidmar has also prepared an unpublished report on medical
malpractice cases in Pennsylvania (2002), in which he studied 22 cases
involving jury verdicts of greater than $5 million. He was unable to “accu-
rately estimate the total amounts received by plaintiffs,” but estimated that
the mean per-case haircut was 78 percent for $5–10 million verdicts, and 83
percent for verdicts over $10 million.
Appendix B: Imputation Rules for Pre- and
Postjudgment Interest
We impute interest for the cases in which it was not reported following the
rules set forth below. The Texas rules for computing prejudgment interest
are complex, and were changed or recodified several times over the period
we study. Further details, including citations, are available from the authors
on request. The postjudgment interest rules, fortunately, are simpler.80
Availability of Prejudgment Interest
Prejudgment interest was generally not available for judgments prior to a
Texas Supreme Court decision (Cavnar ) issued on June 5, 1985. Cavnar
changed the longstanding common-law rule prohibiting prejudgment inter-
est.81 For jury verdicts before June 5, 1985, we assumed that the plaintiffs did
not preserve their right to this interest, and set imputed prejudgment inter-
est = 0.
Prejudgment Interest for Specific Types of Damages
Prejudgment interest was not available on punitive damages for the entire
relevant period. It was available for future damages for judgments from
September 2, 1987 (when the Texas Legislature first codified the prejudg-
80We expect that few readers will read this appendix, and that even fewer will read the footnotes.
If you have gotten this far, then for more than you probably want to know about the Texas rules
on prejudgment and postjudgment interest, see Barber and Montford (1988:102–03) (article by
the legislative authors of the 1987 statutory amendments); Johnson (2005) (article on the 2003
amendments to these rules); Pemberton (1999) (discussing judicial interpretations of the
rules); Carlson (2004:§ 27.31).
81Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
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ment interest rules) through August 1, 2003. We have no data on which
portion of damages is future damages, so we assume this portion is zero. This
could lead to overestimating prejudgment interest for cases with verdicts
from June 5, 1985–September 2, 1987 (two cases in our sample) or after
August 1, 2003 (six cases in our sample).
Availability of Postjudgment Interest
Postjudgment interest was available during the entire relevant period, on the
court judgment (including prejudgment interest) plus court costs. We have
no data on court costs, so we assume they are zero. This will lead to some
underestimation of postjudgment interest. We estimated postjudgment inter-
est for the period from the date of trial to the date when the last-filed claim
report involving the claim was closed. This will overestimate postjudgment
interest if there is more than one paying defendant and a significant gap
between payment dates. We can obtain a lower bound on this overestimate by
studying cases in which we have duplicate closed claim reports. For 16 cases
involving duplicate claims closed in different years, the overestimate of
postjudgment interest was $1.4 million, or 5.4 percent of the total estimated
postjudgment interest of $26.9 million.
Date of Court Judgment
The interest rate rules, when they change, generally change based on the
date of the court judgment. Prejudgment interest is awarded through the
date of court judgment; postjudgment interest accrues thereafter. We have
data on the date of the jury verdict but on not the date of court judgment; we
assume the two are the same.
Interest Rate
The interest rate on prejudgment interest was 10 percent per year for
judgments from June 5, 1985 through August 1, 2003. A 2003 legislative
change reduced the rate to 5 percent for judgments after August 1, 2003.
The postjudgment interest rate was 10 percent through August 1, 2003, and
5 percent thereafter.82
82From September 2, 1987 on, the rate is actually a floating rate with a minimum and a
maximum, but it was at the 10 percent minimum for the entire period from September 2, 1987
through August 1, 2003, and at the reduced 5 percent minimum from August 1, 2003 through
December 31, 2003.
66 Hyman et al.
Compounding
Prejudgment interest was compounded daily for judgments from June 5, 1985
through September 2, 1987. After that date, prejudgment interest was simple.
Postjudgment interest was compounded annually during the whole period.
Period for Which Prejudgment Interest is Available
Prejudgment interest is generally computed from 180 days after the earlier
of when the suit was filed or 180 days after written notice of the claim was
received. We lack information on when plaintiffs provided written notice to
defendants, so use the date a lawsuit was filed as the starting date. This could
result in underestimation of prejudgment interest in some cases.
Tolling of Prejudgment Interest Period
For judgments after September 2, 1987, the period for computing prejudg-
ment interest is tolled (or the amount on which it is available is reduced) by
a defense settlement offer, depending on how the offer relates to the sub-
sequent verdict. There is also judicial power to toll the prejudgment interest
period for plaintiff-caused delay. We do not have data on settlement offers or
discretionary tolling, so we assume that neither exist. This could result in
overestimation of prejudgment interest in some cases.
Court Decisions on Contested Issues
Some interpretation issues were resolved by court decision. For example, the
courts decided only in 2002 that under the 1987 statutory amendments, the
death cap applied to the sum of (compensatory damages + prejudgment
interest), rather than to compensatory damages alone.83 We assume that these
interpretations were in effect for the entire period the statute was effective.
The understandings of the parties or the trial judge may differ in some cases.
Appendix C: Glossary of Selected Terms
Above-limits cases: Single-payer cases with adjusted verdict > policy limits.
Adjusted allowed verdict: Adjusted verdict less any reduction due to remittitur,
jnov, and statutory caps on damages.
Adjusted verdict: Jury verdict plus prejudgment interest (as reported or, when
not reported, as estimated), plus postjudgment interest (estimated based on
83Columbia Hosp Corp. of Houston v. Moore, 92 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tex. 2002).
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statutory rate), See Appendix B for the rules we used to estimate pre- and
postjudgment interest.
Aggregate dollar haircut: Defined for a set of cases, indexed by i, as:



















Below-limits cases: Single-payer cases with adjusted verdict < policy limits.
Haircut: Defined for all 306 plaintiff jury verdict cases in the BRDminus data set









max 0 1, .
Thus, haircut is defined to be nonnegative; it equals 0 for cases with
payout > adjusted verdict.
Mean (median) per-case haircut: Defined for a sample of cases as the mean
(median) of the haircuts for the individual cases in the sample.
Multidefendant case: A case in which two or more defendants were sued by the
plaintiff.
Multipayer case: A case in which payments were made by two or more defen-
dants, or by both a primary and excess insurance carrier for a single paying
defendant.
Primary report: When there are two or more claim reports relating to the
same injury, we treat the last report as the primary report and earlier reports
as “duplicate” reports. Except when assessing out-of-pocket payments by
defendants, we include only primary reports in our data set.
Single-defendant case: A case in which only one defendant was sued by the
plaintiff.
Single-payer case: A case in which payment was made by only one insurer, on
behalf of only one defendant. We treat a case with payments on behalf of a
single defendant by both a primary and excess insurance carrier as a multi-
payer case.
Year: Coded in regressions as (Year – 1988).
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